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THE ARGUMENTS OF LAW, POLICY 
AND PRACTICE AGAINST SWISS-TYPE 
PATENT CLAIMS 
Daniel Armstrong* 
Swiss-type patent claims were first recognised by Switzerland in 1984 as a means of permitting drug 
manufacturers to gain patent protection following the discovery of a known substance's second or 
subsequent medical use.  Despite dubious legal foundations, particularly the questionable existence of 
sufficient novelty, Swiss-type claims have been accepted in Europe, England, and, in a recent Court of 
Appeal decision, New Zealand.  Additionally troublesome is that the dominant reason for their 
acceptance has been the drive for uniformity in national patent laws, a desire that precluded 
consideration of the various negative practical consequences of accepting such claims.  This topic has 
received little academic comment and this essay redresses that in the most assertive of ways by arguing 
that Swiss-type claims are illegal, primarily due to a lack of novelty, and that they should be illegal for 
various reasons of policy and practice. 
I INTRODUCTION 
"We do not have oil, copper, gold, silver, gas, anything", observes Johannes Randegger, a 
representative of Swiss-based pharmaceutical giant Novartis. "We have mountains and our 
brains … and for patent applications and number of Nobel Prize winners, we are within the 
top group."1 Mr Randegger's pride is based on Switzerland's long history of achievement in a 
range of fields where intellect is employed in the most creative and demanding ways. The 
excellence achieved by Rolex, Victorinox, Lindt, and other household names ensures that in a 
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB(Hons) requirements at Victoria University in 2000. 
1  Anonymous "Chemical Industry Continues to Invest in Research" The Washington Times, Washington 
DC, United States, 20 January 2000 <http://www.washtimes.com/internatlads/switzerland/20.html> 
(last accessed 30 September 2000). 
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diverse range of fields, "Swiss made" connotes the use of high skill, precision craftsmanship, 
and inventive techniques.  
Switzerland's intellectual productivity reaches its pinnacle in the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries. The export sales of Swiss-based multinational drug companies like 
Novaris and Hoffman La Roche brought 26.0 billion Swiss francs into Switzerland in 1996.2 
Drug manufacturing is a pillar in the Swiss economy; the industry employed 28,000 people in 
19963 and created immeasurable benefits for those in the industry's supporting infrastructure, 
including manufacturing contractors,4 suppliers of drug making equipment, advertising 
companies, empirical research companies, and export middle-men.  
The manufacturers of Switzerland's expensive, high quality goods benefit greatly from 
trademark, passing off, industrial copyright, and patent laws. This essay focuses on patent law, 
and in particular a specific form of patent claim first recognised in 1984 by the Swiss Patent 
Office. Known today as a "Swiss-type claim", it greatly aids the Swiss economy by increasing 
the level of protection available to drug manufacturers.  
The self-serving aspect of Swiss-type claims is accentuated by the compelling arguments 
why they should never have been introduced. At every stage of their expanding acceptance, 
from Switzerland, to Europe, to Britain and beyond, the legal legitimacy of Swiss-type claims 
has been suspect. Nor have the courts addressed the practical problems of allowing such 
claims. Yet Swiss-type claims survive, popping up in new jurisdictions like holes in the 
proverbial dyke. Ten months ago, Swiss-type claims received New Zealand's stamp of 
approval.5 Spurred by that decision, this essay raises a voice against this great "Swiss miss".  
  
2  Elsbeth Altmann "Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (Switzerland) Industry Sector Analysis" (US & Foreign 
Commercial Service and the US Department of State, Washington DC, 6 June 1998) 
<http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/switzerland/isa/isar0019.html> (last accessed 29 
September 2000). 
3 Swiss Health Website "The Pharmaceutical Industry" <http://www.swisshealth.ch/full/ 
pharma.htm> (last accessed 29 September 2000). 
4  For example, Lonza Biologics, a member of the Swiss-based Alusuisse-Lonza Group. See "Swiss 
Pharamaceutical Manufacturer Lonza Biologics' US Investment Reaches $58 Million" 
<http://www.swissemb.org/ls/body_lonza.html> (last updated 6 January 2000). 
5  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). 
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II SWISS-TYPE CLAIMS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED  
A What Is a "Patent Claim"? 
In 1852 the United Kingdom began requiring patent applicants to file a complete 
specification of their patent's subject-matter. The complete specification was to describe the 
invention so the public could use it once the patent monopoly expired. The specification was 
also used to determine the patent's validity and scope. This duality of purpose was problematic 
because the invention's description, intended to facilitate understanding of its workings, could 
easily extend beyond the actual thing or method invented. In 1883, the United Kingdom 
introduced a requirement that patentees include within the complete specification a claim, or 
claims, to act as a distinct statement of the invention. "Claims", including Swiss-type claims, 
therefore define the scope of a patent monopoly.6  
B What is a "Swiss-Type Claim"? 
Swiss-type claims can most basically be described as a variety of "subsequent medical use" 
claim, made when someone discovers that a known drug has a previously unknown medical 
use. Beyond this the answer becomes complicated, for, as one English judge has remarked, 
understanding Swiss-type claims requires an initiation in the "Byzantine logic of patent law".7 
To explain Swiss-type claims it is necessary to first explain why other, more intuitive forms of 
patent claim do not avail drug manufacturers. 
1 Aspirin example 
The drug aspirin will be used as an illustration. The active chemicals in aspirin are 
acetylsalicylic acids. These cling to protein cells, preventing them from producing 
prostagladins. Prostagladins play an important role in inducing swelling and causing our 
nervous system to register pain, hence Friedrich Beyer & Co originally marketed aspirin as a 
drug to ease pain and swelling. But recently it was discovered that prostagladins also cause 
blood to clot. Blood clots are one cause of heart attacks, and so aspirin is now also used in the 
preventative treatment of heart attacks. If we imagine the position of the company responsible 
for discovering and proving this new use of aspirin, what types of patent claim could be made?  
  
6  See generally Alan W White "The Function and Structure of Patent Claims" (1993) 15 EIPR 243. See also 
Evan's Medical Patent [1998] RPC 517, 576 (UK Pat Ct) per Laddie J: "[f]irst one must identify what the 
alleged invention is, that is to say what is covered by the claims of the patent…". 
7  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 271 (UK Pat Ct) per Jacob J. 
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There appear to be two possible "product claims" and two possible "use claims". A product 
claim is one where the subject-matter is a physical entity itself, whereas the subject-matter of a 
use claim is a physical activity, or series of activities, performed with or upon an entity.8 Use 
claims are also called method claims or process claims. Product and use claims can also be 
"purpose-limited", meaning that infringement will occur only if the patented product or use is 
replicated with the patented purpose in mind. 
2 Options one and two: product claims over the drug and/or active chemicals  
The two possible "product claims" in our aspirin example would patent either the aspirin 
medicament or acetylsalicylic acids themselves. However, these claims would be disallowed 
because only new products or uses can be patented, and the aspirin and acetylsalicylic acids 
already exist.9 Although the use is new, this would not assist the maker of a product claim. 
A leading authority on this point is Adhesive Dry Mounting Co Ltd v Trapp & Co10 ("Adhesive 
Dry Mounting"). The case concerned a thin membrane made from dipping tissue paper into a 
gum resin solution. An expired patent for the membrane itself had earlier been granted to Mr 
Jeyes, with its contemplated uses including use as tracing paper or for wrapping tea or tobacco. 
But following the discovery by members of the public that the membrane formed an adhesive 
when heated, a retailer sought to patent its use in "dry mounting" photographs and other 
documents onto cardboard or similar material. Parker J (later Lord Parker) decided as a matter 
of construction that the patentee's first claim was a use claim, and the second a product claim 
to the membrane itself. As regards the product claim, Parker J said,11 
Jeyes does not suggest that this material can be used for mounting photographs, or any analogous 
purpose … But after Jeyes's patent [expired] it was open to all the world to make and sell such a 
material. The idea of using an old material for an entirely new purpose, not being analogous to 
purposes for which it has theretofore been used, may be good subject-matter, but such idea, 
however ingenious, can hardly justify a claim for the material itself.  [emphasis added]  
  
8  Pyrrolidine Derivatives / Hoffmann-La Roche [1984] OJ EPO 174, Case T 128/82, point 1.3 (EPO); Alan W 
White "The Function and Structure of Patent Claims" (1993) 15 EIPR 243, 245. 
9  The novelty requirement is discussed further below. 
10  Adhesive Dry Mounting Co Ltd v Trapp & Co (1910) 27 RPC 341 (EWCA). 
11  Adhesive Dry Mounting Co Ltd v Trapp & Co (1910) 27 RPC 341, 353 (EWCA). 
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This passage has been interpreted as saying that a mere "novelty of purpose" cannot uphold 
product claims. Yet implicit in Parker J's statement is that a use claim could succeed (the use 
claim in question failed because it was obvious). Therefore the case stands for the proposition 
that if a patent is sought over X (whether a product or use), novelty must derive from X itself. 
This rule is reflected in the Manuel of Patent Practice of the UK Patent Office, which states, "if 
the invention lies in a new method of using a known material only the new method can be 
claimed."12  [emphasis added]  
Importantly, the applicant's product claim might have succeeded in Adhesive Dry Mounting 
if the product underwent some material change so as to render it "novel". For example, a drug 
in pill-form taken to treat high blood pressure could not be re-patented if it was found to treat 
acne, but could be patented if reformulated from a pill into an ointment. 
An important authority on the extent of differentiation necessary is Ciba-Geigy (Durr's) 
Application13 ("Ciba-Geigy"). Patent protection was sought following the discovery that a 
herbicide known to affect dicotyledonous weeds could also be used against monocotyledonous 
weeds. The applicant made a product claim for the known herbicide, arguing the requisite 
novelty derived from the new instructions for the new use adorning the container. The English 
Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating,14 
There seems to us to be nothing inventive about parceling up the known material in any and every 
convenient package or container having written thereon the information that it can be used for the 
stated purpose in the stated loci … . There is nothing novel in the mere presentation of information 
by ordinary writing or printing on a container. 
Ciba-Geigy was decided under the UK's previous patent legislation, but subsequent cases 
show it still applies under the Patents Act 1977. In Bayer AG (Meyer's) Application15 ("Bayer"), 
Bayer sought a patent following their discovery that a known compound was effective in 
treating cerebral disorders. However, a previous Bayer specification had disclosed this 
compound for use against heart disorders. This precluded a claim to the compound itself, so 
Bayer claimed a "commercial package" containing the compound plus instructions for its 
  
12  Manual of Patent Practice [in the United Kingdom Patent Office] (4 ed, December 1999) para 2.43 
<http://www.patent.gov.uk/dpatents/mpp/manual.html> (last viewed 29 September 2000). 
13  Ciba-Geigy (Durr's) Application [1977] RPC 83 (EWCA). 
14  Ciba-Geigy (Durr's) Application [1977] RPC 83, 89  (EWCA) per Russell LJ. 
15  Bayer AG (Meyer's) Application [1984] RPC 11 (UK Pat Ct). 
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newly discovered use against "cerebral insufficiency". These claims were rejected because the 
prior disclosure rendered the concept of packaging the drug obvious, and the mere 
presentation of information was deemed obvious by section 1(2)(d) of the Patents Act 1977.16  
So in our aspirin example, product claims for the aspirin or acetylsalicylic acids would fail 
for lack of novelty, notwithstanding their newly discovered use, unless the physical form of the 
aspirin medicament was sufficiently altered. Re-branding or re-packaging the aspirin with new 
instructions would not suffice. 
3 Option three: use claim over the use of the drug  
The third possibility for our hypothetical aspirin manufacturer is to patent the use of 
aspirin in treating heart attacks. This use claim avoids the novelty problem encountered by 
product claims because the patent is over the very thing from which novelty derives. Claims in 
the form, "use of known substance X for new purpose Y", are thus generally acceptable. The 
leading Commonwealth authority on this is National Research Development Corp v Commissioner 
of Patents,17 ("NRDC"). NRDC concerned claims over the use of known substances for the new 
purpose of weed control. The issue was whether a new use could rightfully be regarded as a 
patentable "invention", defined by statute as, "any method of new manufacture the subject of 
letters patent and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies…".18 The 
High Court of Australia concluded it could be, rejecting the view that "inventions" involved the 
production or alteration of a vendible or tangible product.19 NRDC was adopted in Ciba-Geigy, 
meaning that although the patentee's product claim over the herbicide was rejected (for want of 
novelty), their claim for using that herbicide against monocotyledonous weeds was allowed.  
  
16  "Packaging-plus-instructions" claims are clearly non-patentable on a number of grounds. They were 
rejected in Ciba-Geigy for lack of novelty, in Bayer for non-inventiveness (obviousness), and, in another 
case Dow Corning Corporation (Bennett's) Applications [1974] RPC 235 (UK Pat Ct), for being a disguised 
attempt at patenting a method of medical treatment. 
17  National Research Development Corp v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
18  Patents Act 1952 (Cth), s 6 "invention". 
19  This view had been articulated in Australia in Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 706 per Dixon J. 
Referring to a method of permanently waving hair, Dixon J said, "the object is not to produce or aid the 
production of any article of commerce." This passage was adopted in New Zealand in Maeder v 
"Ronda" Ladies' Hairdressing Salon [1943] NZLR 122, 177-8 (CA) per Myers CJ. See also Re GEC's 
Application (1942) 60 RPC 1 per Morton J.  
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On NRDC alone, drug manufacturers could theoretically patent every new use of a drug. 
However, a well-established exception to this general rule precludes reliance upon NRDC in 
the area of medical use claims. Due to ethical considerations, patents on methods of medical 
treatment are widely prohibited. This prohibition, and its merits, are considered below when it 
is argued that Swiss-type claims unwisely undermine it. For now it suffices to observe that in 
our aspirin example a claim for, "the use of aspirin for treating heart attacks", would fail.  
4 Option four: use claim over the use of the active chemicals (Swiss-type claim) 
For drug manufacturers the unavailability of the above claims poses a conundrum; once the 
patent on a drug used for a particular purpose expires, they cannot secure a renewed exclusive 
right to make and sell that drug if a new use is found (or revealed to the public, as the case may 
be). Their salvation is the Swiss-type claim. It is a purpose-limited use claim that focuses not on 
the use of the drug, but on the use of the active chemicals to make the drug, side-stepping the 
prohibition on medical method of treatment patents. Specifically, the patentee claims the 
exclusive right to use the relevant active chemicals in manufacturing a drug for the new treatment 
purpose. A Swiss-type claim in our aspirin example would cover, "the use of acetylsalicylic 
acids to make aspirin for treating heart attacks."  
Some might call Swiss-type claims creative, others inelegant, and one commentator has 
referred to their wording as "tortured".20 Nevertheless, the Swiss should be afforded some 
congratulations. Despite dubious legal status and clear and compelling policy reasons for 
disallowance, Swiss-type claims have taken root in both the civil and common law worlds, 
allowing manufacturers the world over the luxury of securing new patents and production 
rights for making old drugs.  
In this author's opinion, it is time to remove this luxury. The assault against Swiss-type 
claims proceeds on two fronts; first the legal arguments are considered, followed by non-legal 
arguments focusing on the practical effects of their recognition.  
III  THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SWISS-TYPE CLAIMS  
Patent law is not a creature of common law. It is bound by and defined by legislation. A 
patent outside the wording of a jurisdiction's patent legislation is ultra vires and illegal. This 
  
20  John R Thomas "Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Claims" 
(1998) 17 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 219, footnote 1. 
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part of the essay argues that Swiss-type claims were not allowed under the laws of the various 
jurisdictions through which they have passed, primarily for lack of novelty. 
A Swiss-Type Claims in Europe  
1 The European Patent Office and convention  
The European Patent Convention (EPC), in force since 1 June 1978, aims to harmonise the 
national laws of its Contracting States and to provide a more efficient system for Europe-wide 
patent registration. The European Patent Office (EPO) is the executive branch of the European 
Patent Organisation, a body established to adjudicate upon and register European patents. It 
was the EPO's Enlarged Board of Appeals (Enlarged Board) 1985 decision in Re Eisai Co Ltd21 
("Eisai") that first gave Swiss-type claims judicial approval, and thus legitimacy Previously, 
Swiss-type claims were only authorised by paragraph 243.4(b) of the Swiss Patent Office's 
Guidelines,22 
The use of a product for preparing an agent for surgical, therapeutic or diagnostic purposes, for 
example the processing of an active substance into a ready-to-use drug form. Such a claim is 
grantable. It can also be formulated if the use to which it relates is the second (or further) indication 
of a known drug substance. 
As statutory creatures, a patent's validity predominantly raises questions of statutory 
interpretation. Eisai was an exercise in the interpretation of the EPC, specifically Articles 52(1), 
52(4) and 54(5) of the EPC's English language version.23 Article 52(1) expresses three 
requirements for patentability: novelty,24 inventiveness,25 and industrial applicability.26 
Article 52(4) contains the prohibition on patenting methods of treating humans "by surgery or 
  
21  Re Eisai Co Ltd [1985] OJ EPO 64, Case GR 05/83. 
22  English translation submitted by counsel for the patent applicant in John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's 
Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545 (UK Pat Ct). 
23  The EPC has three authentic texts, one English, one French, and one German.  
24  This disqualifies all things previously "made available to the public by means of a written or oral 
description, by use, or in any other way". This is the definition from EPC Article 54(2) of what is in the 
"state of the art". 
25  This disqualifies all novel things that are too obvious from past disclosures. 
26  This disqualifies all novel and non-obvious things that cannot be put to use, for instance due to a lack 
of clinical testing. 
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therapy", and on patenting "diagnostic methods practiced on the human body". The 
prohibition operates through the legal fiction that such methods are incapable of industrial 
application. 
2 Eisai 
Eisai did not originally relate to Swiss-type claims. The decision arose because the EPO's 
Technical Board of Appeal for Chemistry, faced with seven separate appeals from rejected 
patent applications, all turning on the same issue, referred a question of law to the Enlarged 
Board. The seven appellants had all claimed the use of a product for treating humans, and the 
question was whether these were permissible under the EPC. While Article 52(4) would appear 
conclusive, the then-recent Hydropyridine27 decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Court of Justice) had cast doubt on its effect. Faced with a claim for the use of a known 
substance in treating cerebral disorders (the same discovery considered in Bayer), the German 
court indicated that claims in the form "use of a known product to treat an illness" should be 
accepted. They felt such claims extended beyond a claim to a method of medical treatment 
because they incorporated the patentable acts of packaging and marketing the drug for its new 
use.28  
Hydropyridine gave heart to drug manufacturers, hence the rash of patent applications that 
produced the seven appeals decided by Eisai. But the Eisai Board rejected Hydropyridine, stating 
that such claims were identical to claims for a method of medical treatment and so excluded by 
Article 52(4). The Enlarged Board communicated this initial finding to the appellants, but also 
suggested that a type of claim then permitted in Switzerland might rescue them. Submissions 
on the legality of Swiss-type claims were invited, with the primary hurdle for the appellants 
being the requirement of "novelty" in Article 52(1).  
The argument adopted by the Enlarged Board, which accorded Swiss-type claims the 
requisite novelty, relied upon a dubious interpretation of Article 54(5). The Article's first 
paragraph defines "novel" inventions as those outside the "state of the art", and paragraphs two 
through four explain that phrase. Article 54(5) then says that the preceding paragraphs, "shall 
not exclude the patentability of any [known] substance or composition … for use in a method 
referred to in Article 52(4), provided that its use for any method referred to in that paragraph is 
  
27  Hydropyridine [1984] OJ EPO 26 (German Fed Ct J). 
28  See the discussion in Alan W White "The Function and Structure of Patent Claims" (1993) 15 EIPR 243, 
248.  
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not [known]." [emphasis added]. Article 54(5) thus allows a known product to be patented on 
the basis of its new medical use, even though that use is itself unpatentable due to Article 52(4). 
This is clearly an exception to the rule that a patent's novelty must derive from its subject-
matter.  
But what is the specific type of claim allowed? The deliberate use of "any" is crucial because 
it limits Article 54(5) to purpose-limited product claims where a first medical use is discovered 
for an old substance. Discovery of a second or further medical use would not support a fresh 
patent. This is because by the time of the second use's discovery, the first medical use is already 
known, breaching the proviso that the drug be unknown for use in any method of medical 
treatment.29 
This interpretation of Article 54(5) involves no twisting of the words and accords with the 
stated intentions of several European delegates in EPC conference working papers.30 The 
simple rule framed in the EPC is that known substances can be re-patented upon discovery of a 
medical use, but not when further medical uses are discovered. This represents a balance 
between the competing concerns of promoting pharmaceutical research and maintaining 
freedom of action in the medical arena. Leaving for later discussion the question of whether 
this approach is defensible in principle, the fact remains that this was the law at the time of 
Eisai. 
The Enlarged Board of Appeals did not feel constrained by this plain-language 
interpretation. Article 54(5) was not treated as a limited exception to the general requirements 
of patentability, and did not receive the narrow construction required.31 Instead, the Enlarged 
Board observed that Article 54(5) allowed the novelty for purpose-limited product claims over a 
known substance to be derived from the new medical use. They reasoned that if this type of 
  
29  This interpretation is seemingly approved in Manual of Patent Practice [in the United Kingdom Patent 
Office] (4 ed, December 1999) paras 2.44-2.46 <http://www.patent.gov.uk/dpatents/mpp/ 
manual.html> (last viewed 29 September 2000).  
30  Gerald D Paterson "The Patentability of Further Uses of a Known Product Under the European Patent 
Convention" (1991) 13 EIPR 16, 17. 
31  See Harvard Oncomouse [1990] OJ EPO 476, Case T0015/90, where, speaking of another exception in the 
EPC, it was said, "Article 53(b) is an exception, for certain kinds of inventions, to the general rule under 
Article 52(1) that European patents "shall be" granted for all inventions which are susceptible of 
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step. Any such exception must, 
as repeatedly pointed out by the Boards of Appeal, be narrowly constructed." See also Plant Genetic 
Systems Plant Cells [1995] OJ EPO 545, Case T0356/93. 
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claim could draw novelty from a new medical use, so too could Swiss-type claims for the use 
of known substances in making known drugs. Secondly, the Board found no intention to limit 
the scope of Article 54(5) to first, and only first, medical uses of known products, meaning that 
Swiss-type claims could also draw novelty from second or subsequent uses. This blatantly 
ignored the use of "any" in Article 54(5). The Board's unconvincing argument was that the 
heuristic expressio unius est exclusio alterius32 could sometimes cause injustice.  
The first four paragraphs of Article 54, which define "novelty", came from the Strasbourg 
Convention 196333 and so Europe had experienced their operation. Conversely, Article 54(5) 
was derived from a specific form of patent only allowed in France, and then only until 1978. Its 
inclusion in the EPC introduced, in the words of the EPO, "a special concept of novelty 
unknown in other technical fields."34 In 1974, the draft version of Article 54(5) was referred to 
as a "cuckoo's egg" because of its potential to supersede Europe's various rules of novelty.35 
Eisai proved this prediction true. As a cuckoo grows larger than its surrogate parents expect, so 
too has Article 54(5) grown beyond its intended scope. Article 54(5) originally accorded 
novelty to product claims; Eisai expanded it to accord novelty to use (of active chemical) 
claims. Article 54(5) allowed novelty to be drawn from first medical uses only; Eisai allowed 
novelty to derive from second and subsequent uses as well.  
This extension of Article 54(5) was supposedly "justifiable by analogy".36 But in actuality 
the Enlarged Board wrongfully distilled from a specific statutory exception a much wider rule, 
of potentially general application, allowing patent claims to succeed despite deriving novelty 
from something other than the patent's subject-matter. 
  
32  "When one thing is expressed the alternative is excluded." 
33  Strasbourg Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for 
Invention 1963. 
34  See Gerald D Paterson "The Patentability of Further Uses of a Known Product Under the European 
Patent Convention" (1991) 13 EIPR 16, footnote 5, citing [1984] OJ EPO 164, Case T128/82. 
35  O Bossung "Invention and Patentability in European Patent Law" [1974] Mitteilung 101, 126. Cited in 
Gerald D Paterson "The Patentability of Further Uses of a Known Product Under the European Patent 
Convention" (1991) 13 EIPR 16. 
36  Re Eisai Co Ltd [1985] OJ EPO 64, Case GR 05/83, para 21. 
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The opportunity for a common law court to assess Swiss-type claims arose soon after, in 
John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application / Schering AG's Application37 ("Wyeth & Schering"). 
B Swiss-Type Claims in England  
1 Wyeth & Schering per Hearing Officer Bailey  
In two separate decisions in 1984 and 1985, Hearing Officer Bailey rejected Swiss-type 
claims for lack of novelty. The Wyeth claim was based on the discovery that certain 
guanidines, used for treating high blood pressure and ulcers, also prevented diarrhoea. The 
discovery behind the Schering claim was that certain aromatase-inhibitors, used to treat breast 
cancer, were effective against prostatic hyperplasia. Mr Bailey noted with an air of cynicism, 
"the pharmaceutical industry feels that there is a need to have a suitable way of claiming such 
alleged inventions."38  
Mr Bailey heard Wyeth's application before Eisai, but by the time of Schering's application 
the EPO's approval of Swiss-type claims was well known. Eisai was not binding, but was 
highly persuasive. EPC Articles 52(1), 52(4) and 54(5) are reproduced in sections 1(1), 4(2), and 
2(6), respectively, of the UK's Patent Act 1977, and are deemed to have the same meaning as 
their European counterparts.39 The Act's recital states it is, "to give effect to certain 
international conventions on patents", including the EPC and when applying the Act, "any 
decision of, or expression of opinion by, the relevant convention court on any question arising 
under or in connection with the relevant convention", must be noted.40 Consequently the 
English judiciary has said they should, "work on the basis that the corresponding provisions of 
the [EPC] are of direct effect."41 
Nevertheless, Mr Bailey comfortably rejected Eisai and Swiss-type claims. He recognised 
the resulting anomaly that patents granted under the EPC might be refused in England, but he 
could not escape the clear meaning of section 2(6) (equivalent to EPC Article 54(5)). His key 
observation was that, "[w]hile it may be that the law has changed in respect of claims to known 
  
37  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545 (UK Pat Ct). 
38  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545, 555 (UKPO). 
39  Patents Act 1977 (UK), s 130(7). 
40  Patents Act 1977 (UK), s 91(1). 
41  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 258-259 (UK Pat Ct) per Jacob 
J. 
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substances and compositions which are being regarded as novel under section 2(6) … I do not 
think that it necessarily follows that the same considerations should be applied generally."42 [emphasis 
added]. In other words, Mr Bailey recognised that Article 54(5) only permitted product claims 
based on a product's first medical use. Swiss-type claims fell outside the section's ambit 
because the presence of "any" meant that substances with previous medical uses were 
excluded, and secondly, because the section referred to product claims, not use (of chemicals to 
make a drug) claims.  
Mr Bailey also applied this interpretation of section 2(6) to deny patents in Bayer and in 
Sopharma SA's Application.43  
Mr Bailey also denied that novelty could be found independently of section 2(6). He 
identified the binding Court of Appeal decisions in Adhesive Dry Mounting and Ciba-Geigy as 
binding authorities for the proposition that new uses of products could not support patent 
claims to the products themselves. This, however, should not have been sufficient to dismiss 
the applicants' claims, for of course a Swiss-type claim is not over a known product itself but 
over the known process of making that product. The better approach would have been to 
derive from those cases the wider rule implicit therein that novelty in a patent over X must 
derive from X itself.  
Nevertheless, Mr Bailey reached the correct result in finding Swiss-type claims bereft of 
suitable novelty. This victory was unfortunately erased when both decisions were appealed to 
the Patent Court. 
2 Wyeth & Schering per Falconer and Whitford JJ 
Sitting en banc, Falconer and Whitford JJ in the Patent Court were unable to fault Mr 
Bailey's interpretation of the Patents Act 1977 and case-law. They also were unconvinced by 
Eisai, saying, "we think the better view would be that a claim in the Swiss form … would not be 
patentable as lacking the required novelty."44 Yet on the verge of relegating Swiss-type claims 
to the status of historical footnote, they abandoned their legal reasoning for the ideal of 
conformity, concluding,45 
  
42  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545, 551 (UKPO). 
43  Sopharma SA's Application [1983] RPC 195 (UKPO). 
44  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545, 565 (UK Pat Ct). 
45  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application [1985] RPC 545, 567 (UK Pat Ct). 
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Eisai's approach to the novelty of the Swiss type of use claim … is equally possible under the 
corresponding provisions of the 1977 Act and, notwithstanding the opinion expressed earlier as to 
the better view of the patentability of such a Swiss-type claim … having regard to the desirability of 
achieving conformity, the same [Eisai] approach should be adopted to the novelty of the Swiss type 
of claim. 
English decisions following Wyeth & Schering generally omit reference to the hesitancy 
expressed by Falconer and Whitford JJ.46 Not until 1998 and Jacob J's judgment in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Company v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc47 ("BMS") did judicial concern at the legality 
of Swiss-type claims and the "obvious difficulties with Eisai"48 reappear.  
3 BMS per Jacob J 
BMS concerned taxol, an anti-cancer drug administered over a twenty-four hour infusion 
period. At issue was a Swiss-type patent granted in Europe for the use of taxol to manufacture 
a drug to administer over a three hour infusion period, with pre-medication, thereby reducing 
the risk of adverse side effects. Jacob J invalidated the patent because previous public lectures 
on taxol rendered the benefits of three hour infusions obvious. However, his Honour, was 
disturbed by the fact that were it not for this defect, the patent would have stood on the basis 
of Eisai. He posed the following hypothetical questions,49  
Take a newly discovered use for aspirin (one was discovered not so long ago, namely its use to 
reduce risks of heart attacks). The manufacture of aspirin pills is old. So why is the manufacture 
rendered new because there is a new use? Or why does adding the purpose of the manufacture of 
aspirin to the claim make the manufacturing process any newer? 
In this passage, His Honour recognised the difficulty in reconciling common sense with 
granting a patent for a manufacturing process that has been freely available for decades. 
Nevertheless, echoing Wyeth & Schering, he concluded,50 
  
46  See, for example, Hoerrmann's Application [1996] RPC 341 (UKPO), which simply records that Swiss-
type claims are accepted in England after Wyeth & Schering. 
47  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253 (UK Pat Ct). 
48  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272 (UK Pat Ct) per Jacob J. 
49  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272 (UK Pat Ct). 
50  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 272 (UK Pat Ct). 
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UK courts must have regard to the decisions of the EPO on the construction of the EPC … they are 
of great persuasive authority, first because they are decisions of expert courts … involved daily in 
the administration of the EPC and secondly because it would be highly undesirable for the 
provisions of the EPC to be construed differently in the EPO from the way they are interpreted in 
the national courts of a Contracting State. … It is a matter of the utmost seriousness for any court to 
depart from a decision of an Enlarged Board of the EPO on a point of law, and, if it is to be done at 
all by a national court, I think it should only be done by a higher national court and not one of first 
instance. For the sake of coherence of the system as a whole first instance courts should exercise 
self-restraint, however erroneous they may think a particular decision of law of an Enlarged Board may be. 
[emphasis added] 
4 BMS per Aldous, Buxton and Holman LJ 
Jacob J's decision was upheld on appeal,51 although his thinly veiled disapproval of Eisai 
was tempered. Aldous LJ said, "[t]he patent judges in the John Wyeth case correctly 
summarised the approach of the Enlarged Board and I believe that they came to the right 
conclusion in the cases before them."52 Buxton LJ concurred, "I do not think that it is open to us 
to act on those criticisms [of Eisai], even if they were thought to have force."53  
The Court rejected the contention that the presence of "any" in Article 54(5) limited that 
paragraph to discoveries of first medical uses. However, the Court's reasoning was highly 
contentious. Buxton LJ believed, "if the aim were to exclude from further patentability any 
substance already used in a medical application, art 54(5) could have simply said so."54 He 
then indicated that if Article 54(5) read, "provided that its use for any other method of treatment 
etc is not already [known]", its extension to accord Swiss-type claims novelty would not have 
happened.55 This was a startling conclusion. The only way His Honour's suggested wording 
  
51  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521, 
(EWCA). 
52  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 37. 
53  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 76. 
54  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 80. 
55  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 80. 
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differed from the EPC was that, "any other method of treatment", was substituted for, "any 
method referred to in that paragraph [52(4)]". It borders on the absurd to argue a distinction in 
meaning since Article 52(4) does no more than describe the particular methods of medical 
treatment that cannot be patented.  
Apart from this shaky legal reasoning, the decision also rested on the oft-invoked principle 
of conformity. This desire to foster homogenous patent law throughout Europe is 
understandable. Insular, nationalised lines of authority would shatter the ideal of a Europe-
wide patent regime, inhibit European commerce and prevent English judges from influencing 
the development of European patent law. However, the fact that three years after Wyeth & 
Schering, the Appellate Division of the Netherlands Patent Office rejected Swiss-type claims 
casts doubt on the European unity that the English judiciary eagerly preserved.56  
One can also argue that the desire for homogeneity should yield to the principled 
development of patent law. While it may be preferable for courts of first instance to "fall in 
line" with doubtful authorities, it is unfortunate that the English appellate courts have also felt 
constrained. Their inversion of the priority of making good law with that of maintaining 
consistency institutionalised Swiss-type claims in England, much to the benefit of UK 
pharmaceutical giants like Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham. It also opened the door 
to the spread of these claims throughout the Commonwealth.   
C Swiss-Type Claims in New Zealand  
New Zealand's approval of Swiss-type claims was also linked to conformity. On March 22, 
1990, New Zealand's Commissioner of Patents issued a practice note stating that product 
claims for pharmaceuticials would be rejected if the alleged novelty only resided in a new 
use,57 
If the compounds are new such a claim is allowable. However, if the compounds are known, and 
their use in pharmaceutical compositions is known, such claims are not allowable even if the 
  
56  See Gerald D Paterson "The Patentability of Further Uses of a Known Product Under the European 
Patent Convention" (1991) 13 EIPR 16, 18, referring to [1988] OJ EPO 405, Case 16673. Note, however, 
that this decision was effectively overturned when the Dutch Patent Law was amended in 1995. See 
also Todd Martin "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study" (2000) 82 J 
Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 381, footnote 131 and accompanying text. 
57  The practice note is reproduced in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents 
[2000] 2 NZLR 529, 531 (CA). 
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particular pharmaceutical use is new. This is because the pharmaceutical composition prepared is 
not novel unless it is materially different from previous compositions; the fact that it is intended to 
be used to treat a medical condition different from that for which it has previously been used is 
irrelevant. 
This statement accorded with Adhesive Dry Mounting and Ciba-Geigy. But on July 7, 1997, 
the Commissioner issued another practice note stating that Swiss-type claims would now be 
accepted to keep New Zealand in line with a "continuing international trend".58 The 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd ("Pharmac"), responsible for managing 
pharmaceutical subsidies in New Zealand, sought judicial review of the Commissioner's 
decision. The Commissioner did not oppose Pharmac alone, for twenty-five international drug 
manufacturers, plus the Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand, applied 
to be joined as co-defendants. In Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of 
Patents59 ("Pharmac"), this coalition obtained a declaratory judgment from the Court of Appeal 
that Swiss-type claims were legal.60  
New Zealand labours under the dated provisions of the Patent Act 1953, modelled on the 
repealed Patents Act 1949 (UK). There is no statutory prohibition on patenting methods of 
medical treatment, and no section like EPC Article 54(5) from which Swiss-type claims can 
leach novelty. However, these rules do exist in New Zealand case-law, with the result that our 
law as relevant to Swiss-type claims is similar to that of Europe and Britain.  
The all-important requirement of novelty exists in our Act, albeit in a different form.61 New 
Zealand allows patents for "inventions", defined as, "any method of new manufacture the 
  
58  The practice note is reproduced in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents 
[2000] 2 NZLR 529, 531 (CA).  
59  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). 
60  The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Gallen J in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The 
Commissioner of Patents [1999] RPC 752 (HC). 
61  Note that in February 1992 the Ministry of Commerce published Reform of the Patents Act 1953: Proposed 
Recommendations, which recommended amending the Patents Act 1953 to include the EPC's three 
criteria for patentability: novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability. See Philip Culbert "Patent 
Law Reform in New Zealand: Should Methods of Medical Treatment be Patentable?" [1997] 5 Patent 
World 32, 37. Amendment of the Act has been put on hold pending further consultation with Maori 
groups, particularly on the issue of patenting life forms. See Kenneth B Poplewell (NZPO 
Commissioner) "The TRIPs Agreement: Implementation and Enforcement" (Apec Industrial Property 
Rights Symposium, August 1996) <http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp/saikine/nz.htm> (last accessed 30 
September 2000). 
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subject of letters patent and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies [or] 
any new method or process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of 
manufacture".62  
The prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment, codified in Article 54(2) of the 
EPC, exists in New Zealand through Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents63 
(discussed below).  
New Zealand case-law also mirrors EPC Article 54(5) in permitting the discovery of a first 
pharmaceutical use of a known substance to support a purpose-limited product claim. In New 
Zealand, this rule exists because the courts accept that the requisite novelty comes from 
reformulating the known substance in a "pharmaceutically pure form".64 This reflects the rule 
that novelty must reside in a patent's subject-matter; the claim is a product claim and is 
permissible only because the court entertains the argument that the product becomes new 
through conversion into a pharmaceutically pure form. Gault J, who delivered the Court of 
Appeal's unanimous judgment in Pharmac, criticised this reasoning because it ignored the fact 
that the truly novel part of the invention lay in the new medical use. He said,65 
The step necessary to render Swiss-type claims acceptable would be to recognise what is in fact the 
situation, that the novelty … resides in the newly discovered purpose for which the medicament is 
to be used. That is the step the Enlarged Board took "by analogy" in the Eisai case. 
Though it may be true to identify the new medical use as the immediate source of novelty, 
this novelty cannot support a multitude of different patent claims. It can only support a claim 
to that new medical use itself. The very fact that in order to permit a product claim the law relies 
on a legal fiction (that a pharmaceutically pure version of a substance is a "new" substance), 
shows that the novelty of the end-use is useful only to a point. This novelty of use cannot 
support a product claim, and nor should the Court have let it support a claim directed at the 
very different use claimed through the Swiss-type formulation.    
  
62  Patents Act 1953, s 2 "invention". 
63  Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385 (CA). 
64  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 539 (CA). 
65  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 541 (CA). 
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Gault J also referred to EI Du Pont de Nemours & Co (Witsiepe's) Application,66 where Lord 
Wilberforce described the law relating to so-called "selection" patents.67 These patents are 
based on the discovery that chemicals selected from a previously known class have previously 
unrecognised advantages. As with "first pharmaceutical use" claims, selection patents involve a 
type of product claim where the true source of novelty is probably the product's end-use. But 
again this novelty is legally incapable of supporting a product claim. Instead, the product is 
deemed novel because the new, smaller group of chemicals is different from the larger class.68 
While artificial, the reasoning underlying both "first pharmaceutical use" and "selection" 
patents is consistent with the rule that novelty must derive from a patent's subject-matter, and 
not from a related use or product which is not claimed. 
Having illustrated the similarity in the laws underlying the patent regimes of New Zealand, 
Europe and England, Gault J concluded,69 
We have not been persuaded that there is anything in the New Zealand Patents Act or in the 
judicial decisions of this country which directly precludes a similar process of reasoning to that 
adopted in Eisai. We reject the contention that that decision was dictated by provisions of the EPC 
which are to be distinguished from the position in New Zealand. 
In other words, the similarity of our laws with Europe's allowed Eisai's faulty derivation of 
novelty to be applied. 
D Conclusions on the Legality of Swiss-Type Claims 
Swiss-type claims are directed to patenting the use of active chemical ingredients. They 
should be denied for want of novelty unless that use is novel, such as would occur if a different 
manufacturing process was used. The Eisai approach to finding novelty for such claims was 
unprincipled, and in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary should be rejected. 
Article 54(5) of the EPC provided one such exception, allowing a particular type of purpose-
limited product claim to derive novelty from a novel end-use. But Eisai wrongly allowed 
novelty to be derived from a drug's new medical end-use even when it was a completely 
  
66  E I Du Pont de Nemours & Co (Witsiepe's) Application [1982] FSR 303 (HL). 
67  E I Du Pont de Nemours & Co (Witsiepe's) Application [1982] FSR 303, 309 (HL). 
68  The New Zealand Court of Appeal had previously taken the view that selection patents were not 
permitted, see Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Company [1981] 1 NZLR 600 (CA).  
69  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 544 (CA). 
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different "use" (that of active ingredients in making the drug) that was claimed. It also ignored 
the presence of "any" by allowing novelty to derive from second and subsequent medical uses.  
Swiss-type claims break the rule that novelty must derive from the thing patented; a 
product claim must be for a novel product, a use claim must be for a novel use. It confounds 
common sense that a company, which has for decades manufactured a drug using an 
unchanging process, can somehow gain a fresh patent over that manufacturing process purely 
because a new use for the manufactured good is discovered. If anything, that company should 
receive a monopoly over the newly discovered use, but if they are precluded from doing so by 
the prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment, this is no excuse for distorting 
patent law to satisfy their desire for protection. 
 With alarming success a drafting trick designed to benefit Switzerland's drug 
manufacturers has crept into the patent law regimes of several countries. Apart from the 
European, English, and New Zealand authorities already discussed, Swiss-type claims are 
accepted in, for example, Australia,70 South Africa,71 and Israel.72 The expansion has been 
characterised by a frustrating unwillingness to challenge the received "wisdom" of the EPO 
Enlarged Board of Appeals, a hesitancy partly attributable to the trend towards regional and 
international harmonisation of intellectual property laws.73  
Regrettably, as more decisions in favour of Swiss-type claims mount it will become 
progressively harder for a non-timorous court to assert the better view that such claims lack 
novelty. The need for action is urgent because the window of opportunity to right Eisai's  
 
  
70  See Bill Bennett "Australia: Intellectual Property - Recent Developments in Australian Intellectual 
Property Law" (1998) 20 EIPR N161. 
71  See David G Sheppard "Case Comment: South Africa: Patents: Infringement - Second Medical Use" 
(1995) 17 EIPR D76, commenting on Elan Transdermal Ltd v Ciba-Geigy. 
72  See Michael Cohn "Israel: Patents" (1993) 15 EIPR 81. 
73  The ultimate outcome of this trend may be a global patent system. See, for example, Gerald J 
Mossinghoff  "World Patent System Circa 20XX AD?" (1999) 1 Yale Symp L & Tech 3 
<http://lawtech.law.yale.edu/symposium/99/speech_mossinghoff.htm> (last accessed 26 September 
2000). 
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wrong is closing. The EPO has not questioned Eisai,74 and has recently taken further moves to 
enshrine its decision by rewriting EPC Article 54(5) to read,75 
Where the subject-matter of the invention is a substance or composition for use in a method 
referred to in Article 53(c), the substance or composition shall without prejudice to paragraphs 2 
and 3, be deemed to be new, provided that that use is not comprised in the state of the art. 
This will remove the problem identified above with the use of "any". The change could be 
implemented as soon as the EPC diplomatic conference scheduled for December 2000,76 and 
would represent a step towards entrenching Swiss-type claims.77  
The spectre of legislative interference in favour of Swiss-type claims makes it imperative to 
discuss not only why these claims are illegal, but why they should be illegal. These arguments 
focus on issues of policy and practicality, and occupy the remainder of this essay.  
IV THE ARGUMENTS OF POLICY AND PRACTICE AGAINST SWISS-TYPE 
CLAIMS 
This part of the essay first explains that the decision whether Swiss-type claims should be 
accepted is essentially one of policy to be reached after considering all relevant factors. It is also 
argued that the final say on Swiss-type claims should come from the world's legislatures, 
rather than judiciaries. Following this preliminary discussion, the essay examines the various 
aspects and effects of Swiss-type claims which, in this author's opinion, demand they be 
disallowed. 
  
74  In 1989 a request to refer to the Enlarged Board the question whether Eisai contradicted the EPC's 
wording and intentions was refused. See Gerald D Paterson "The Patentability of Further Uses of a 
Known Product Under the European Patent Convention" (1991) 13 EIPR 16, 18, referring to 
unpublished Case T297/88, dated 5 December 1989. 
75  Draft Basic Proposal For Revision of The European Patent Convention, 46 <http://www3.european-patent-
office.org/dwld/dipl_conf/pdf/ec00100_.pdf> (last accessed 30 September 2000). Note that the 
prohibition on method of medical treatment patents will be moved from Article 52(4) to Article 53(c). 
76 See Mayall's IP Links <http://www.mayallj.freeserve.co.uk/european.htm#revisions> (last updated 
17 June  1999). 
77  Note it would not solve the problem of extending a provision permitting product claims to permit 
Swiss-type claims, which are use (of chemicals to make drugs) claims. 
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A The Balancing Process and The Desirability of a Legislative Solution 
From the first national patent law, the Venetian Law of 1474, up to 1995 when the World 
Trade Organisation was established, the single guiding principle in all national patent laws 
and international conventions has been that public interest should have primacy over 
commercial interests.78 Clearly it is in the public interest for all people to have access to drugs 
needed to treat their ailments. The paradox is that it is also in the public interest to promote 
research and development by providing patent monopoly incentives. Therefore, whenever the 
extent of intellectual property protection is at issue, the answer of whether, and how far, 
protection should be extended is unavoidably a policy decision based on a judgment call of 
where to strike a balance between these interests.79 As Lockhart J said when considering 
method of medical treatment patents,80 
Ultimately the resolution of this question is a balancing exercise. There is on the one hand a need to 
encourage research in connection with methods of medical treatment and on the other hand the 
need not unduly to restrict the activities of those who engage in the therapy of humans.  
This balancing exercise requires a careful analysis of the competing social and economic 
factors at play in a particular jurisdiction. These factors, "are not necessarily the same for all 
countries."81 On any one issue there will be several options to consider; for example, instead of 
prohibiting patents on methods of medical treatment a nation could introduce a defence of 
necessity,82 introduce compulsory licensing laws, or reduce the term of such patents.83 Where 
possible, a legislative answer to these issues is preferable because, "courts are certainly not the 
  
78  Consumers International: Trade, Patents & Health "Trade Briefing Paper No 4" (1999) 
<http://www.consumersinternational.org/trade/trade_brief/trade-health.html> (last accessed 30 
September 2000).  
79 JM Aubrey "A Justification of the Patent System" Phillips J (ed) Patents in Perspective (ESC Publishing, 
Oxford, 1985) 6. 
80  Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 141, 156 (FCA). 
81  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 532 (CA). 
82  See Steven L Nichols "Hippocrates, The Patent-Holder: The Unenforceability of Medical Procedure 
Patents" (1997) 5 Geo Mason L Rev 227, 260. 
83 Although this would only mitigate, rather than solve, the problems posed by method of medical 
treatment patents by squeezing their operation into a shorter time-frame, see Chris J Katopis "Patients 
v Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation" (1997) 71 St John's L Rev 329, 359. 
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appropriate forum for addressing the broad policy questions raised by the … patent debate."84 
In Wellcome, McMullin J said, "patent law is a rather artificial, highly complex and somewhat 
refined subject. It involves scientific and commercial features outside everyday experience and 
the knowledge of the courts. Therefore, any major thrust should be left to Parliament."85  
The wisdom of this was made apparent by the Court of Appeal's approach in Pharmac. The 
parties presented typical "research incentive versus open dissemination" arguments. After 
admitting that the Court faced a "complexity of economics",86 Gault J recorded that Gallen J in 
the High Court believed the opposing positions were "equally supportable".87 The matter was 
then dropped without further discussion. So, when faced with difficult, competing 
socioeconomic arguments for and against Swiss-type claims, the Court preferred to let them 
"cancel each other out" rather than give them serious consideration.  
The courts have ignored the balance-point struck by the EPC's negotiators on the issue of 
subsequent medical use patents. Article 54(5) enshrined the judgment call that a known 
substance should be patentable one more time, and only one more time, following discovery of a 
medical use. This contradicted the prohibition on method of medical treatment patents, but 
still represented a stance on how far this prohibition would be undermined. Against this 
background, the argument that because there is no essential difference between the discovery 
of a first, second or third medical use, therefore all should be capable of supporting a fresh 
patent, is misguided. It misses the point that the decision to differentiate between these 
discoveries is not based on legal principle, but on policy considerations.  
A similar argument of law, seemingly supported by Gault J in Pharmac,88 is that since 
patents over surgical equipment and new drugs are acceptable, surely those based on new 
methods of using drugs are also acceptable. Again this fails to appreciate that discrimination 
  
84 Robert M Portman "Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes 
Impediment to Medical Progress" (1996) 4 Uni Balt IP LJ 91, 111, citing Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 
447 US 303, 318, "matter[s] of policy [are] for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of 
investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot." 
85  Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385, 398 (CA). 
86  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 532 (CA). 
87  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 533 (CA). 
88  Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 538 (CA), 
referring to the distinction as "illogical". 
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between these patent types is the result of balancing the competing considerations before 
consciously selecting a particular location at which to draw the line of patentability.89  
These considerations resulted in the "first medical use only" balancing point framed in 
Article 54(5). Instead of this rule, Pharmac committed New Zealand to an alternative balancing 
point first proposed by a country with a world-class pharmaceutical industry and ratified by 
courts unconcerned with arguments as to its practical consequences. Under this approach, the 
potential number of drug-manufacturing monopolies greatly increases. Virtually all of these 
monopolies will be owned by foreign companies, and the fact that New Zealand is, by a very 
great measure, a net importer of intellectual property suggests we should have thought twice 
before adopting Switzerland's position.  
Another reason for hoping that the world's legislatures will re-take the issue out of the 
courts' hands is that the original approval of Swiss-type claims emanated from as high an 
authority as the EPO's Enlarged Board of Appeals. Therefore, as mentioned above, the hands of 
lower courts are frustratingly tied. Sadly Pharmac, a decision of a national appellate court, will 
probably have a similar roll-on effect in future unless Parliament, or a brave court in another 
jurisdiction, intervenes. The remainder of this essay canvasses six reasons why this 
intervention should occur. 
B Swiss-Type Claims Undermine The Prohibition on Patenting Methods of Medical 
Treatment  
1 Why is this prohibition necessary? 
Patents are a species of intellectual property, and carry the corollary rights of ownership 
such as the right of exclusive use.90 These rights are granted to inventors as a reward for their 
  
89  For further reasons on why patents over medical products are distinguished from patents over 
methods of treatment, see Philip Culbert "Patent Law Reform in New Zealand: Should Methods of 
Medical Treatment be Patentable?" (1997) 5 Patent World 32, 38. 
90  Todd Martin "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study" (2000) 82 J Pat & 
Trademark Off Soc'y 381, 381. However, the rights attaching to intellectual "property" are not absolute, 
and so it is perhaps more appropriate to view intellectual property rights as "quasi-property". 
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work and as an incentive for others to do likewise.91 Thus patents are fundamentally 
concerned with legal rights and the provision of financial incentives.  
Medicine, in contrast, is a realm where professionalism and ethics generally triumph over 
selfish temptations to assert legal rights.92 Despite the introduction of free-market reforms to 
many countries' health sectors, including New Zealand's, the romantic notion persists that the 
art of medicine is not motivated by economics: 93 
It is well known that the medical profession do all in their power to discourage members of their 
body from obtaining protection for any discovery that has for its object the alleviation of human 
suffering, and it is impossible to speak too highly of such conduct, ... . 
Extending patent protection into the medical world only introduces a new and dangerous 
economic motivation to medical practitioners, a motivation which carries with it the right to 
monopolise aspects of the healing arts. 
A good example of the dangers posed by medical patents is provided by recent happenings 
in the United States. American courts have taken a liberal approach to patentability, "anything 
under the sun that is made by man",94 can qualify. In conjunction with decisions of the US 
Patent and Trademark Office,95 the American medical profession thus operates without any 
prohibitions on patenting methods of medical treatment.96 Instead, the monopolisation of 
medical breakthroughs has been minimised by the powerful ethical ideal of sharing 
information which might advance the profession's ultimate aim of improving the human 
  
91  See, for example, HI Dutton The Patent System and Inventive Activity During The Industrial Revolution 
1750-1852 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 17-29; Cornish Intellectual Property and 
Allied Rights (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, England, 1989) para 3.024.  
92  See Martin v Wyeth Inc (1951) 96 F Supp 689 (D Md).  
93  Re C & W's Application (1914) 31 RPC 235 (HL) per Lord Buckmaster. 
94 Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 US 303, 309, holding that genetically engineered micro-organisms are 
patentable. 
95  The leading decision is Ex Parte Scherer (1954) 103 USPQ (BNA) 107 (Pat Off Bd App). 
96  Note that in 1902 and 1903, the US Congress considered, without passing, "a Bill amending the statutes 
relating to patents, relieving medical and dental practitioners from unjust burdens imposed by 
patentees holding patents concerning methods and devices for treating human diseases, ailments, and 
disabilities." See Robert M Portman, "Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure 
Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress" (1996) 4 Uni Balt IP LJ 91, footnote 10 and 
accompanying text. 
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condition.97 But several doctors recently broke this trust in a series of dismaying decisions to 
abuse the availability of patent protection, contrary to the spirit of the Hippocratic Oath. Most 
notoriously, Dr Sam Pallin patented a method of making a v-shaped, "self-suturing" scalpel 
incision during cataract surgery. He then prosecuted another doctor for writing an article 
about "his" method.98 This and similar cases99 illustrate the danger of asserting intellectual 
property rights in the medical arena. Under then-existing American law, patentees like Dr 
Pallin could terrorise other doctors with demands for royalties and threats of lawsuits, 
unacceptably fettering their choice of how best to diagnose disease and treat their patients.  
Fear of these stifling conditions has led almost all Western jurisdictions to introduce a 
prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment either through statute or case-law.100 
One of the first Commonwealth cases addressing this issue was Re C & W's Application,101 
where a patent over a process of extracting metals from living bodies (particularly lead from 
humans) was refused. This essay has already discussed the statutory prohibition in Europe and 
England, and the New Zealand approach is described below. Elsewhere, Canada's leading 
authority is Tennessee Eastman Co v Commissioner of Patents102, where a method of binding 
wounds with a polymer was held non-patentable.103 The prohibition is also sanctioned in 
international conventions other than the EPC. Article 27(3) of the TRIPs agreement permits 
member states to, "exclude from patentability … diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods 
  
97  See generally the discussion in Martin v Wyeth Inc (1951) 96 F Supp 689, 695 (D Md).  
98  Pallin v Singer (1993) 36 USPQ (2d) 1050 (Vt). Note that Pallin's patent was invalidated for obviousness 
and lack of novelty after the defendants produced evidence showing that another ophthalmologist had 
performed more than 375 of the sutureless surgeries in the month before Dr Pallin's claimed invention 
date. 
99  For example, in 1991, Dr John Stephens patented a method of identifying male and female genitalia in 
ultrasound images in order to determine an unborn foetus' gender. This patent was denounced since, 
"holding a patent for foetal anatomical sex assignment is rather like holding a patent for telling the 
difference between the right hand and the left hand." See "The War Over Method Patents: Mine, Yours, 
Ours" [1994] 10 ARGUS 8. 
100 For a general overview of the history of the prohibition, see David Kell "Expanding the Frontier of 
Patentability: Methods of Medical Treatment of the Human Body" (1995) 17 EIPR 202. 
101 Re C & W's Application (1914) 31 RPC 235 (HL). 
102 Tennessee Eastman Co v Commissioner of Patents, (1972) 8 CPR (2d) 202 (SCC). 
103 See further Todd Martin "Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study" (2000) 
82 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc'y 381, 417-418. 
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for the treatment of humans or animals." Similar wording exists in Article 1709(3)(a) of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. 
The glaring exception is Australia. In Joos v Commissioner of Patents,104 Barwick CJ 
concluded that since medicine was a field as economic as any other, methods of medical 
treatment were capable of industrial application. Although the court appeared to distinguish 
cosmetic treatments (patentable) from therapeutic treatments (non-patentable), the decision 
was still ambiguous as to whether the prohibition actually existed.105 But in Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd106 ("Rescare"), Lockhart and Wilcox JJ said in obiter dicta that since 
nothing in the Patents Act 1990 expressly precluded methods of medical treatment patents, 
they should be allowed. The dissenter, Sheppard J, preferred to reject all such patents on public 
interests grounds. The picture was temporarily clouded by Heerey J in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co 
v FH Faulding & Co Ltd,107 who adopted Sheppard J's dicta in invalidating a patent over a 
method of administering taxol.108 However, the Full Federal Court recently overturned this 
part of Heerey J's judgment, but again, since the patent was invalidated for other reasons their 
approval of medical method of treatment patents was obiter dicta.109 Despite the lingering 
legal uncertainty, the Australian Commissioner of Patents asserted that method of medical 
treatment patents will to be accepted.110  
Despite pressure from lobbyists, including the Medical Procedure Patent Coalition and the 
American Medical Association, the United States has not introduced a general ban on method 
  
104 Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611. 
105 David Kell "Expanding the Frontier of Patentability: Methods of Medical Treatment of the Human 
Body" (1995) 17 EIPR 202, 203. 
106 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd, (1994) 122 ALR 141 (FCA), affirming Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205 (FCA) per Gummow J. 
107 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 467 (FCA). 
108 The patent was the same as faced by the English court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton 
Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 258-259 (UK Pat Ct); (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA). 
109 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 439 FCA) paras 12-18, 142. 
110 Bill Bennett "Australia: Intellectual Property - Recent Developments in Australian Intellectual Property 
Law" (1998) 20 EIPR N161. 
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of medical treatment patents.111 However, a "tacked-on" provision of the Fiscal Year 1997 
omnibus spending bill insulated doctors and hospitals from liability by introducing a law 
preventing patentees from bringing suits based upon, "a medical practitioner's performance of 
a [patented] medical activity".112 The shortcoming of this immunity is that it only applies to 
medical techniques and procedures; patents on the use of drugs are still enforceable against 
medical practitioners.113 Since patents for the use of known drug X in treating disease Y are 
enforceable, Swiss-type claims are unnecessary in the United States. 
It is submitted that the prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment, including 
methods involving no more than administering a dosage of a drug, is desirable. The rapid 
advances in medicine during the twentieth century were largely attributable to the free 
exchange of medical practitioners' inventions and discoveries. The American Medical 
Association regards this traditional sharing of knowledge as an ethical duty: 114  
Physicians have an obligation to share their knowledge and skills and to report the results of 
clinical and laboratory research. This exchange improves the quality of patient care through early 
evaluation of technological advances and rapid dissemination of improvements, greatly benefiting 
the health and welfare of society. The intentional withholding of new medical knowledge, skills, 
and techniques from colleagues for reasons of personal gain is detrimental to the medical 
profession and to society and is to be condemned. 
The New Zealand Medical Association's Code of Ethics similarly implores medical 
practitioners to, "totally avoid the use of secret remedies", and to, "[e]nsure that any new 
therapeutic or diagnostic method is described through professional channels and the benefits, 
  
111 Perhaps the term "reintroduced" would be more appropriate. The US Patent and Trademark Office 
used to refuse method of medical treatment patents. See, for example, Ex parte Brinkerhoff (1883) 24 Dec 
Comm'r Pat 349 (USPTO), where it was said, "[t]he methods or modes of treatment of physicians of 
certain diseases are not patentable…". The USPTO's stance was adopted in early judicial decisions. See, 
for example, Morton v New York Eye Infirmary (1862) 17 F Cas 879 (SD NY), invalidating a patent for the 
use of ether as an anaesthetic during surgery. 
112 Patents Act 35 USC s 287(c). 
113 Patents Act 35 USC  § 287(c)(2)(A). 
114 Robert M Portman "Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes 
Impediment to Medical Progress" (1996) 4 Uni Balt IP LJ 91, 104, citing "Opinion on New Medical 
Procedures" in Code of Medical Ethics, Current Opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
(1994) s 9.08. 
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if proved, made available to the profession at large."115 Profit motives are also frowned upon; 
"standards of care should not be compromised in order to meet financial or commercial targets 
whether these are set by a doctor personally or by an organisation."116 
Jacob J's judgment in BMS is cited several times in this essay with approval. However, one 
aspect which causes concern is his apparent doubt that the prohibition is necessary. His 
Honour said,117  
The thinking behind the exception is not particularly rational: if one accepts that a patent monopoly 
is a fair price to pay for the extra research incentive, then there is no reason to suppose that that 
would also apply to methods of treatment. It is noteworthy that in the US any such exception has 
gone, and yet no-one, so far as I know, suggests that its removal has caused any trouble. 
In this author's opinion, the uproar following the Pallin litigation, specifically the 
profession's alarm at patentees' ability to stifle peer review and sabotage effective health care, 
plus Congress's rapid moves to mitigate the prohibition's effects by insulating medical 
practitioners from liability, does show that the prohibition is beneficial and the previous 
American approach, troublesome. 
2 The prohibition in New Zealand 
In Commissioner of Patents v The Wellcome Foundation118 the Wellcome Foundation sought to 
patent the use of malaria drugs for treating meningeal leukemia. Davison CJ allowed the 
patent in the High Court,119 but the Court of Appeal reversed in a judgment which became 
New Zealand's leading authority on the prohibition. In reaching this result, Cooke J, as he then 
was, said, "[t]here remains ... a deep-seated sense that the art of the physician or the surgeon in 
alleviating human suffering does not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade and 
commerce."120 
  
115 New Zealand Medical Association Code of Ethics <http://www.nzma.org.nz/about/ethics.rtf> (last 
accessed 30 September 2000). 
116 New Zealand Medical Association Code of Ethics <http://www.nzma.org.nz/about/ethics.rtf> (last 
accessed 30 September 2000). 
117 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc [1999] RPC 253, 274 (UK Pat Ct). 
118 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385 (CA). 
119 Wellcome Foundation v Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
120 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385, 388 (CA). 
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Previously, several legal arguments were made against medical method of treatment 
patents. Primarily, new uses of known products were not considered "inventions", defined as 
"methods of new manufacture". This argument was laid to rest in NRDC (discussed above), 
and in Wellcome, Cooke J recognised that, "the suggestion in part of the argument for the 
Commissioner that a discovery of a new use for a known product cannot provide a basis for a 
grant must, in its bald form, be rejected as outmoded."121  
Another legal argument against medical method of treatment patents arose from the 
definition of "invention" as a method of new manufacture within section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies 1623. Section 6 excluded manners of new manufacture, "contrary to the law [or] 
mischievous to the state by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally 
inconvenient".122 There was room to argue that being "contrary to law or morality" or 
"generally inconvenient" was thus a legal bar to patentability.123 But the view taken in Pharmac 
was that "contrary to law or morality" and "generally inconvenient" were only grounds on 
which the Patent Commissioner, in their discretion, could reject applications.124 
Finally, since section 51 of the Patents Act 1953 provided for the compulsory licensing of 
patented products used in medicine without mentioning method of medical treatment patents, 
the inference was that such patents could not exist. Gault J noted some pre-1977 English 
support for this inference, but since section 51 was repealed in 1992, he considered the 
argument moot.125 
With all legal reasons circumvented, the prohibition on patenting methods of medical 
treatment in New Zealand rests solely upon policy and ethical grounds.126 The prohibition 
today is not absolute, since methods of treating animals, as opposed to humans, are 
  
121 Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [1983] NZLR 385, 388 (CA). 
122 Statute of Monopolies 1623 (Eng), s 6. 
123 See Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 611, 623 per Barwick CJ, suggesting in obiter dicta 
that method of medical treatment patents are generally inconvenient. 
124 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 535 (CA). 
125 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 538 (CA). 
126 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 538 (CA). See 
also Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438, 445 (Pat App Trib) per Graham and Whitford JJ 
"the reasons for such an exclusion appear to us to be based in ethics rather than logic."  
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patentable,127 as are a host of non-necessary or cosmetic types of human treatment.128 But the 
core prohibitions on patenting methods of therapeutic treatment,129 including surgery,130 and 
methods of diagnosis,131 remain. 
3 How do Swiss-type claims undermine the prohibition? 
The Pallin litigation illustrates the sobering truth that despite the strong tradition in the 
medical world of sharing treatment methods, rogues like Dr Pallin cannot be trusted to elevate 
social and ethical concerns above their proprietary and financial interests. Another group 
which cannot be trusted to further the practice of medicine for the good of humanity, rather 
than for their own pockets, are drug manufacturers. There are many examples to illustrate this. 
Swiss pharmaceutical giant Hoffman La Roche recently conspired to fix vitamin prices, 
resulting in a record US $500 million dollar fine paid to the US Department of Justice132 and a 
$632 million payout to settle a class-action civil suit.133 Drug manufacturers Parke-Davis, 
Dainippon, and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer (RPR), discontinued research into much-needed 
tuberculosis antibiotics because these drugs would be "unprofitable".134 When Novartis 
contributed $25 million to Berkeley University's Department of Plant and Microbial Biology's 
in exchange for first rights to their discoveries, they gagged researchers from publishing the 
  
127 Swift & Company's Application [1960] NZLR 775 (SC). 
128 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 537 (CA), 
where Gault J presents a non-exhaustive list of patentable medical treatments.  
129 "Therapy" means, "any treatment which is designed to cure, alleviate, remove or lessen the symptoms 
of, or prevent or reduce the possibility of contracting any disorder or malfunction of the human or 
animal body": Cornea (1995) OJ EPO 512, Case T 24/91. 
130 "Surgery" means,  "the field of medicine involving the healing of diseases or accident injuries, or 
remedies against physical defects by means of a surgical intervention performed on a body": Rainer 
Moufang "Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law" (1993) 24 IIC 18, 37. 
131 "Diagnosis" means, "recognition, differentiation and localisation of pathological conditions": Rainer 
Moufang "Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law" (1993) 24 IIC 18, 45. 
132 John C Hammell "Pharmaceutical Giants Threaten Health Freedom" 
<http://www.toyourhealthmagazine.com/Pharm_Giantsx.html> (last accessed 30 September 2000). 
133 "The Fix Is In: Cartels Beware" Chemical & Engineering News, 21 February 2000, 
<http://www.drrath.com/menue/news_content/usa/aktuell-usa/2000_03_16_01.htm>  (last viewed 
22 September 2000) 
134 Myrna E Watanabe "The Urge To Merge" The Scientist, 2 October 1995, <http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr1995/oct/merger_951002.html> (last accessed 22 September 2000). 
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benefits of their discoveries. Steven Rosenberg, of the US National Cancer Institute, observed, 
"one of the most basic tenets of science is that we share information in an open way. As bio-
tech and pharmaceutical companies have become more involved in funding research, there's 
been a shift toward confidentiality that is severely inhibiting the interchange of 
information."135 Rosenberg experienced this first-hand when a pharmaceutical giant refused to 
tell him safe-dosage levels for an agent used in his experimental cancer treatment. Finally, in 
"Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry", Dr John Braithwaite, a UK Trade Practices 
Commissioner, wrote, "[i]nternational bribery and corruption, fraud in the testing of drugs, 
criminal negligence in the unsafe manufacturing of drugs – the pharmaceutical industry has a 
worse record of law-breaking than any other industry."136 
Swiss-type claims provide another example; their raison d'etre is to circumvent, through 
clever wording, the prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment. As Aldous J 
observed in BMS, "[t]he claim is an unsuccessful attempt to monopolise the new method of 
treatment by drafting it along the lines of the Swiss-type claim."137 Buxton LJ went even 
further in characterising Swiss-type patent as a disguised form of method of medical treatment 
patent: "[i]f the novelty can lie in the nature of use, rather than in the end-result at which that 
use aims, then it is indeed the method of treatment on which patentability rests."138 These 
quotes suggest that Swiss-type claims directly contravene the prohibition, but the better view is 
that they undermine it by promoting the very mischief the prohibition counters: restricting 
medical practitioners' choice of treatments. 
The potential for Swiss-type claims to cause this mischief has escaped the courts' 
awareness. In Pharmac, Gault J believed that because Swiss-type patents only protect the drug 
manufacturing process, and not the actual use of the drug in a method of medical treatment, 
  
135 Jennifer Washburn "The Kept University" Atlantic Monthly, March 2000 
<http://www.newamerica.net/articles/Washburn/washburnAM3.00.htm> (last accessed 22 
September 2000). 
136 John Braithwaite Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1984).  
137 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 63. 
138 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc  (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 83. 
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they will not fetter the medical profession.139 Since only companies guilty of duplicating drugs 
for the medical market would be liable, and not doctors themselves, Gault J thought Swiss-type 
claims consistent with the spirit, as well as the letter, of the prohibition on medical treatment 
patents. 
This argument is superficially attractive, but flawed. It ignores the practical reality that 
manufacturing monopolies can constrain a drug's supply to the point where doctors face real 
problems in acquiring that drug. Restrictions on a drug's availability can fetter the medical 
profession in the same way as restrictions on a drug's use. This was recognised in Eli Lilly & 
Co's Application,140 a case not cited in the European, English or New Zealand cases on Swiss-
type claims. There, the applicant was, "prepared to … disclaim any right to stop doctors or 
hospitals treating human beings with the applicant's compound",141 seeking only a monopoly 
over manufacture, sale, supply and importation (not use). The Patents Appeal Tribunal said,142 
It seems to us therefore that in a case where the alleged invention is based on the discovery of 
unexpected curative properties of known compounds care must always be taken to examine the 
form of the claim actually made. The matter must be looked at as one of substance and if the 
conclusion is that whatever the precise form of words used the true effect of the claim will be to 
prevent the manufacture or supply of the compounds in question for the purpose of treating illness or 
disease in human beings, then the claim must be refused. [emphasis added] 
Swiss-type claims create a manufacturing monopoly where the drug's sole supplier is the 
patentee and its licensees. While product claims for genuinely new drugs and for 
"pharmaceutically pure forms" of known substances create similar monopolies, the added 
drawback of Swiss-type claims is that they allow a single drug to support multiple, subsequent 
monopolies, one for each new use, and can tie the hands of doctors for a longer period of time.  
  
139 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v The Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 538-539 (CA). 
"Can invention in the discovery of a new pharmaceutical use be protected in such a way as to leave 
unrestrained the medical practitioner in the practice of his or her diagnostic, therapeutic or surgical 
methods? In Europe the Swiss-type use claim serves as the means of achieving such protection." 
140 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438 (Pat App Trib). 
141 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438, 443 (Pat App Trib) per Graham and Whitford JJ. 
142 Eli Lilly & Company's Application [1975] RPC 438, 445 (Pat App Trib) per Graham and Whitford JJ. 
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In Rescare, Sheppard J recognised the dire consequences of restricting the availability of 
methods of treatment,143 
It is not going too far, I think, to say that the Court should not contemplate the grant of letters 
patent which would give to one medical practitioner, or perhaps a group of medical practitioners, a 
monopoly over, for example, a surgical procedure which might be greatly beneficial to mankind. 
Its denial might mean the death or unnecessary suffering of countless people. I cannot think that 
this is really what the medical profession as a whole would seek to achieve. Its whole history is a 
denial of this proposition. 
Death and suffering can also arise from limiting a drug's supply sources through Swiss-
type claims. The current legal battle in South Africa surrounding the availability of AIDS drugs 
provides a topical illustration of the consequences of drug-manufacturing monopolies.  
One in seven South Africans harbours the HIV virus. Few of those that develop AIDS can 
afford treatment; the cost of the latest medications is approximately five times the annual per 
capita income.144 Adding to their pain is the fact that much cheaper AIDS medications exist, 
"but a 1995 trade agreement designed to protect companies' intellectual property rights has 
kept them out of the hands of South African doctors."145  
Under pressure and criticism, drug manufacturers have made well-publicised "efforts" to 
find a solution. For example, in May 2000 the world's top five drug manufacturers offered to 
cut certain drug prices in Africa by up to 85 percent.146 These offers were rejected because they 
were perceived as public relations exercises designed to hide the drug firms' true, crippling 
  
143 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 141, 180 (FCA) per Sheppard J (dissenting). 
144 Mike McKee "Tripping Over TRIPs" IP Magazine, September 1999 <http://www.ipww.com/ 
monthly/99-sept/trip.html> (last accessed 30 September 2000). See also Donald G McNeil Jr "Medicine 
Merchants: As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug Companies" New York Times, 
New York, United States, 9 July 2000, which relates the story of a Kenyan police officer on a monthly 
salary of $43. The drug fluconazole, needed to cure his otherwise terminal condition, costs $18 per pill, 
meaning that a full supply would cost $540 a month. A cheaper generic version, made in Thailand in 
violation of drug manufacturer Pfizer's patent, costs sixty cents. 
145 Mike McKee "Tripping Over TRIPs" IP Magazine, September 1999 <http://www.ipww.com/monthly/ 
99-sept/trip.html> (last accessed 30 September 2000). 
146 The companies were Merck, Hoffman La Roche, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim and 
Glaxo Wellcome. See Donald G McNeil Jr "Companies to Cut Cost of AIDS Drugs for Poor Nations" 
New York Times, New York, 12 May 2000.  
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stance147 and to delay the passage of laws permitting the wholesale avoidance of AIDS-drug 
patents.148 The offer was also conditional on the African nations stopping all imports of even 
cheaper generic versions of the drugs from countries which ignore international patent treaties 
(such as India, Bangladesh and Brazil).149 Another example is Pfizer's recent undertaking to 
provide its anti-fungal AIDS-drug fluconazole free to poor South Africans. While ostensibly 
generous, this announcement only came on the same day that a lawsuit and picketing 
campaign which would have embarrassingly denounced the company as an AIDS profiteer 
were due to start.150  
Instead of relying on the superficial, face-saving offers of drug manufacturers to avoid a 
human catastrophe, the South African government took matters into its own hands. In 1997 the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act was amended to permit compulsory licensing 
and parallel importation of cheaper generic versions of AIDS drugs. The result has been 
ongoing litigation,151 supported by drug manufacturers, which has paralysed the country's 
attempts to assist its citizens.  
The whole affair illustrates how patent law is directly responsible for the dearth of 
affordable AIDS drugs, resulting in immeasurable suffering. Jeffrey Trewhitt, spokesman for 
the Washington, DC-based Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, captures 
the manufacturers' legalistic attitude, "[South Africa] could set a very, very bad precedent that 
  
147 Daniel Berman, coordinator of international group Medecins Sans Frontieres' campaign for access to 
essential medicines, says, "we feel strongly that piecemeal donations and pilot projects are not going to 
do it. This is a crisis and it needs crisis responses": Steven Swindells "South Africa: Drug Firms Face 
Fight on Generic AIDS Drugs" Reuters, 13 July 2000. 
148 Rachel L Swarns "Loans to Buy AIDS Drugs Are Rejected by Africans" New York Times, New York, 22 
August 2000.  
149 "South Africa's Mbeki appeals for quick action in AIDS fight" CNN.com, 22 May 2000 
<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/05/22/safrica.mbeki> (last accessed 30 September 
2000). 
150 Donald G McNeil Jr "Medicine Merchants: As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug 
Companies" New York Times, New York, 9 July 2000. 
151 Marjolein Harvey "Pharmaceuticals Resume Litigation Against Government on Medicines Act" WOZA 
Internet, Johannesburg, 1 August 2000. The Notice of Motion in The Pharmaceutical Manfacturers' 
Association of South Africa et al v The President of the Republic of South Africa et al High Court of South 
Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) Case 4183/98 <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/ 
pharmasuit.html> (last accessed 22 September 2000). 
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could undermine legitimate patent protection around the world … ."152 More pointedly, 
Mirryena Deeb, CEO and chief lobbyist of the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association (comprised mainly of subsidiaries of American and European companies) said that 
if South Africa passed the law they would be cut off from all new drug discoveries. In 1998, an 
interviewer asked her if the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association was 
literally threatening to let thousands of South Africans die. Her reply: "in so many words, 
yes."153 The industry's dispassionate adherence to its legal rights has also been observed in 
Thailand, which passed compulsory licensing laws similar to those South Africa desires. Dr 
Korn Dabbarensi, Thailand's health minister, asked, "how "humane" are these manufacturers? 
They are talking to me about the profits of their company against the lives of my people."154  
Consumers in developed countries also face risks from drug manufacturing monopolies. In 
1995, David Mowery wrote an article saying that because only four private, wholly US-owned 
firms supplied vaccines to the American populace, a natural disaster, fire, or war eliminating 
even one of these competitors could gravely impact public health.155 Similarly Swiss-type 
claims, by preventing the development of alternative sources of supply, increase the risk that a 
particular society may one day find needed drugs unavailable.  
In summary, Swiss-type claims create drug manufacturing monopolies which restrict the 
supply of drugs and are thus equally harmful as those experienced in Africa. They reduce 
medical practitioners' choice of treatments and thus undermine the prohibition on method of 
medical treatment patents. A Resolution of the World Health Assembly passed in May 1999 
urged industrialised nations, "to ensure that public health interests are paramount in 
pharmaceutical and health policies",156 something which weighs heavily against Swiss-type 
  
152 Mike McKee "Tripping Over TRIPs" IP Magazine, September 1999 <http://www.ipww.com/ 
monthly/99-sept/trip.html> (last accessed 30 September 2000). 
153 Donald G McNeil Jr "Medicine Merchants: As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug 
Companies" New York Times, New York, 9 July 2000. 
154 Donald G McNeil Jr "Medicine Merchants: As Devastating Epidemics Increase, Nations Take On Drug 
Companies" New York Times, New York, 9 July 2000. 
155 David C Mowery "Improving the Reliability of the US Vaccine Supply: An Evaluation of Alternatives" 
(1995) 20 J Health Politics, Policy & Law 973. 
156 Consumers International: Trade, Patents & Health "Trade Briefing Paper No 4" (1999) 
<http://www.consumersinternational.org/trade/trade_brief/trade-health.html> (last accessed 30 
September 2000. 
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claims. Of course, if all patents that restricted the supply of needed medical products were 
rejected, it would mean the death of all patents for drugs and medical equipment. But if the 
balancing exercise described above is conducted, this outcome would be highly unlikely given 
that it contains no compromise recognition of the public interest in promoting drug research. 
However, allowing Swiss-type claims tilts the balance too far in the opposite direction. 
C Swiss-Type Claims Create "Bad Monopolies" Because They Provide a Superfluous 
Incentive  
1 Good and bad monopolies 
In a 1993 article, Alan White defined "bad" patent monopolies as possessing one of two 
characteristics. Either the patent removes from the public domain something the public already 
possessed, a danger which the requirement of novelty seeks to avoid, or it removes from the 
public domain something the public could have had without giving the inventor a patent 
incentive.157 This second branch is what renders the monopolies granted through Swiss-type 
claims "bad". Swiss-type claims provide a superfluous research incentive. Indeed they were not 
even introduced to promote research but to protect the privileged position of established 
pharmaceutical companies while ensuring them super-profits beyond what could be reaped if 
only one patent were available for each drug manufacturing process. This motive is natural in 
a privatised, market driven industry that for decades has benefited from patent laws 
developed not in answer to the needs and plights of the "public", but rather on nationalistic, 
self-serving grounds.158  
2 Intellectual property protection as an economic tool  
The Unites States Constitution grants Congress the power, "to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries."159 This is the most famous enunciation of 
the "betterment of society" motivation which theoretically underpins intellectual property law. 
The arrival of Swiss-type claims is a bitter reminder that all too often intellectual property laws 
are introduced and adapted for far less idealistic reasons.  
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Copyright law provides a well-known example. From 1557 to 1694 the Licensing Act 
assured the Stationers' Company a monopoly over printing and publishing in England. When 
the Act expired, the Stationers moved to secure their financial position by petitioning 
Parliament to pass the Statute of Queen Anne in 1710,160 the world's first statutory copyright 
law.161 The Stationers used the authors as a figurehead of sympathy. Although in law the 
authors received exclusive rights of exploitation, in reality the printers and publishers, as 
assignees of those rights, truly benefited. The common law's entire copyright system was thus 
introduced not for the stated purpose of encouraging creativity, but to satisfy a particular 
group's thirst for monopoly rents. 
Developments in patent law have also been driven by money-seeking behaviour. 
Switzerland's approval of Swiss-type claims greatly benefited their economy because it granted 
giant Swiss-based drug companies such as Novaris and Hoffman La Roche the ability to gain 
new patents for making old drugs. The history of Swiss patent law reveals other manipulations 
of national patent laws. In the nineteenth century, during a period of rapid industrialisation 
and liberalisation of trade in Europe, Switzerland rejected national patents altogether. When 
Switzerland signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (in force 
since 1883) they took full advantage of the provision permitting signatories to determine areas 
of non-patentability.162  
Patent laws are traditionally regarded as a spur to development and growth,163 but the 
Swiss recognised that patent protection would actually stifle their fledgling pharmaceutical 
industry.164 By persistently refusing to patent drugs, Switzerland ensured Swiss drug 
manufacturers years of borrowing, testing and improving upon foreign inventions. Some of the 
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earliest "defectors" were French chemists who relocated in the resource-rich areas around 
Basel. These chemists brought with them the secret formulae of the dye industry, and it was on 
the back of this industry that the Swiss pharmaceutical giants rose to prominence.165 
Switzerland only allowed pharmaceutical patents in 1977, when its own industry had reached 
a mature stage of development.  
Less than ten years after allowing pharmaceutical patents, Switzerland's Patent Office 
increased their scope by ushering in Swiss-type claims. One factor which may have accelerated 
their acceptance in Europe is the push by Japanese drug manufacturers to take market share 
away from their European and American competitors. The Japanese government has targeted 
the world pharmaceutical industry for domination.166 Author Takayuki Yamamoto observes 
that, "the way the industry is gearing up its research and development engine and looking 
hungrily at overseas markets is faintly reminiscent of the auto industry 40 years ago."167 
Tomonori Miki, executive director of Anyo Corporation contributed the warning that Europe, 
"may be heading toward a pharmaceutical war."168  
Swiss-type claims thus appear to be the latest in a series of patent law developments based 
not on assisting public health but on preserving and increasing the industry's profits. The same 
motive drives other developments in the pharmaceutical world. Since 1993, pharmaceutical 
companies have invested over US $80 billion dollars in mergers and acquisitions.169 Some 
examples are the mergers of American medicine manufacturers Cynamide and Wyeth 
Laboratories in 1997, Swiss pharmaceutical giants Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz to form Novartis in 
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1996,170 and the proposed merger of British giants Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline 
Beecham.171 In 1995, American venture capitalist Larry Bock, founder of a dozen bio-
technology firms, observed that these mergers, "were done more for sales and marketing 
reasons", than for promoting research and advancing the companies' basic missions.172 
At issue is the commodification of the patent system and the redefinition of patent 
attorneys as "intellectual property asset managers". This buzz-phrase reflects how patents are 
no longer perceived as state-granted rewards or incentives, but as privately owned assets to be 
managed and exploited for profit.173  
The strong evidence that financial gain motivates advocates of Swiss-type claims indicates 
that they do not exist or operate to promote research.  
3 The absence of Swiss-type claims would not stifle research  
The respondents in Pharmac trotted out the stock argument that Swiss-type claims make 
medical advances possible by allowing companies to recoup their research costs. This 
argument presumes its own truth and suffers from the fatal defect that,174 
It is simply no more than the barest of hypothesis. There is … little or no empirical data to support 
the proposition that research and investment in new methods of medical treatment would not 
proceed in the same manner and to the same degree without a patents incentive as they would 
with one. 
In Pharmac, the pointed rebuttal of the respondents' argument was that every single second 
medical use discovery in the history of mankind has occurred without the need for a patent 
incentive. This includes the period of rapid medical advances between World War II and the 
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late 1970s.175 In BMS Jacob J said, "I am of course aware of the policy reasons behind … Eisai, 
namely encouragement of research … [but] in any event it is not self-evident that the decision 
in Eisai … [has] in fact encouraged research."176  
Another reason why Swiss-type patents are superfluous is the existence of alternative forms 
of spurring and rewarding discoveries of new uses for drugs. Not all discoveries are made by 
huge multi-nationals, and for the individual practitioner, Western medical systems have their 
own internal reward-systems, including recognition and respect through publication and 
awards.177 Grants provide another source of research funds. "Where capital is needed, grants 
from the federal government and non-profit organisations generally have been available to 
finance these efforts. Thus, there is simply no persuasive evidence that physicians and others 
require an additional proprietary incentive to conduct research …."178 The ability of grants to 
spur research cannot be dismissed as wishful thinking.179 New medical uses for drugs will 
mostly be discovered in Western nations with governments, charities or philanthropists 
wealthy enough to afford such payments. Furthermore, it should not be difficult for Western 
governments to re-deploy money for such grants. The American government, for example, 
currently spends less than two percent of its research and development budget on the medical 
field. Spending on aerospace, computers and electronics research is far greater because of their 
importance for defence.180 
Drug manufacturers themselves could lessen the need for third party funding by increasing 
their own research expenditure. President Clinton blasted the American pharmaceutical 
industry for spending one billion dollars more on advertising than on research.181  
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Dr Schondelmeyer, Professor of pharmaceutical economics at the University of Minnesota, 
estimated that drug manufacturers spend sixteen percent of their budget on promotion, eight 
times more than what other consumer-based companies spend.182 
These considerations suggest that Swiss-type patent monopolies are "bad" because their 
existence does not prompt research, or to put it another way, their absence would not reduce 
the amount of research. Those unconvinced by this argument might perhaps find an 
alternative suggestion palatable; the inclusion of "substantial research and development 
expenditure" as a fourth condition of patentability.183 While guidelines for applying this test, 
including checks against inflated expenditure claims, would be required, this proposal 
represents another option for the world's legislatures to consider. 
D Swiss-Type Claims Support Patents That Are Difficult to Enforce 
In many cases a drug's new use will involve applying it to a patient using the same series of 
physical steps already existing in the state of the art. For example, aspirin is applied in the 
same way regardless of whether the aim is to relieve pain or lessen the risk of heart attacks. 
Thus Swiss-type claims will often rely on a mere "novelty of purpose", as the drug's 
manufacturing and application process will be identical to that in the state of the art. Eisai 
allowed such "novelty of purpose" to support Swiss-type claims in the medical arena, but it 
was not until the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeals decided Mobil Friction Reducing Additive184 
("Mobil") that the grave difficulties arising from deriving novelty in this manner entered the 
spotlight. 
1 Mobil  
Mobil concerned a compound originally added to lubricating oil to prevent rust in vehicles' 
engines. Later it was discovered that the compound also reduced engine friction. The Enlarged 
Board allowed a new patent over the compound's old use (addition to lubrication oil), with the 
requisite novelty being derived from the new purpose. This was despite the fact that 
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consumers had unwittingly benefited from the additive's friction-reducing side-effect for years. 
The Enlarged Board said,185 
With respect to a claim to a new use of a known compound, such new use may reflect a newly 
discovered technical effect described in the patent. The attaining of such a technical effect should 
then be considered as a functional technical feature of the claim (eg the achievement in a particular 
context of that technical effect). If that technical feature has not been previously made available to 
the public by any of the means set out in article 54(2) EPC, then the claimed invention is novel, even 
though such technical effect may have inherently taken place in the course of carrying out what has 
previously been made available to the public." [emphasis added] 
The patent was purpose-limited, in that only people who added the compound to oil for 
the purpose of reducing friction (as opposed to reducing rust), would infringe. It is this point 
around which most of the criticism of Mobil circulates. By sanctioning patents based on a mere 
novelty of purpose, Mobil raised difficult questions of enforcement. Regardless of whether a 
person wishes to reduce friction or to reduce rust, the physical actions of adding the additive to 
oil will be identical. How then can the patentee prove that a particular use of the additive 
breached their monopoly over using the additive for a certain purpose? And what if a person 
used the additive with both purposes in mind? Would liability to the patentee turn on whether 
the patented purpose was the "dominant" purpose, if it was a "substantial" purpose, if it was 
merely present in the infringer's mind, or on some other arbitrary test?  
2 The connection between Mobil and Swiss-type claims 
The criticisms of Mobil are applicable to Swiss-type claims despite the Enlarged Board's 
insistence that Mobil was unrelated to Eisai. They sought to differentiate Eisai as being based on 
the specific interplay between Articles 52(4) and 54(5) of the EPC. The English Court of Appeal 
judges in BMS shared this view, Aldous LJ stating, "I do not believe that the Mobil case 
qualifies or amplifies the conclusion reached in Eisai."186 However, there is an obvious point of 
similarity: in cases where the new treatment purpose of a known drug requires administration 
identical to that which has been done before, a Swiss-type claim will also rely solely upon a 
"novelty of purpose". This led Jacob J to say in BMS,187 
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It is arguable that there is no logical or reasonable distinction between [Mobil] and the decision in 
Eisai. After all it is the novel (second medical use) purpose of the product of manufacture of the 
Swiss-type claim which is said to create novelty. The product and its method of manufacture are 
old. So to try to steer a course between accepting Eisai and yet holding Mobil wrong is at best going 
to involve more Byzantine logic. 
3 The difficulties of enforcing Swiss-type claims  
It is easy to see how the difficulties, identified in the wake of Mobil, with enforcing patents 
based on novelty of purpose could manifest themselves following a Swiss-type claim. Gault J 
observed in Pharmac that, "[a Swiss-type claim] is not a product claim because a combination of 
the active compound and the carrier not made for the purpose of producing a cancer treatment 
medicine would not infringe. Nor would sale of the combination for other purposes … ."188 
This is too simplistic a view of the situation. It fails to appreciate the huge difficulties a 
patentee would face in showing whether a rival company was manufacturing a drug for the 
patented purpose, as opposed to another, non-patented purpose.  
Difficulty might be avoided if the rival drug manufacturer was selling its products to 
consumers who clearly required the drugs for the patented purpose. Returning to our aspirin 
example, it might prima facie infringe a Swiss-type claim based on aspirin's use against heart-
attacks if a rival company made aspirin and sold them to a cardiac treatment clinic. But in this 
author's opinion it is unlikely that a court would base liability on this evidence alone. The clinic 
could have used the aspirin for the non-patented purpose of relieving their patients' general 
aches and pains. Furthermore, it would not necessarily follow from the clinic's intention to use 
the aspirin against heart attacks that the manufacturer made the aspirin with that purpose in 
mind. Liability would be even less likely if the aspirin were sold to a distributor, wholesaler, 
hospital or other entity from which an intention to use the drug in a particular way could not 
be implied. 
The rival drug company's packaging of the drug would be evidence of infringement if the 
package contained, or had written upon it, instructions for the use of the drug in the newly 
discovered method of treatment. It would be easy, however, for the rival company to restrain 
itself from committing such self-incrimination. It could sell its product to a separate 
distribution and packaging company, taking care that any decision on how to market and 
package the drug could not be attributed back to it.  
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Gerald Paterson describes another difficulty in enforcing Swiss-type claims,189 
If a document such as a published patent discloses a first use of a product, a question could arise as 
to whether a patentee of a subsequently filed … patent claiming a second use of that product could 
successfully allege infringement by the first patentee …, if the carrying out of such first use also 
necessarily and unavoidably involves carrying out the second use as well. This question could arise 
in either a medical or non-medical context, following either Eisai or Mobil. 
It is not hard to imagine a drug that, like the additive in Mobil, has two or more 
simultaneous effects. If these effects are discovered at different times by different companies, 
Swiss-type claims would allow them to each gain a monopoly over the manufacture of the 
drug for the purpose of the use they discovered. How would the courts decide whether any or 
all of the companies should be liable for continuing to manufacture the "multi-purpose" drug? 
Quite possibly, in the situation where a drug has two simultaneous effects, a Swiss-type patent 
holder could threaten another company with legal action for doing no more than what it was 
doing before that patent's priority date.190  
In Pharmac, Gault J pointed out that, "infringement depending on the state of mind or 
purpose of the alleged infringer is not unknown to the patent law", relying upon the example 
of, "the exclusion from infringement for the benefit of those practising [an] invention for the 
purpose of bona fide research."191 However, this situation can be distinguished because 
evidence of the alleged infringer's subjective purpose of bona fide research will be provided by 
the infringer themselves. Conversely, in an action for breach of a Swiss-type patent, it is the 
patentee who must prove the alleged infringer's subjective purpose in manufacturing a drug. 
Gault J's assertion that the law already deals with infringement based on the infringer's 
subjective state of mind was therefore misguided as it overlooked the extra difficulty arising 
from the patentee having to prove the infringer's state of mind. 
Gault J also believed the alleged difficulties with enforcing Swiss-type claims were, "more 
apparent than real", because, "under the Medicines Act 1981 the manufacture and sale of 
medicines is closely regulated. The development, trialing, registration, manufacture and 
distribution of a medicine will be unlikely to give rise to difficulties in identifying the purpose 
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for which it is intended."192 Under section 20(2) of the Medicines Act 1981, new medicines 
cannot be sold or advertised without the Minister of Health's consent. Section 21(2) requires 
that the manufacturer or importer's application for consent specify, "the purposes for which the 
medicine will be recommended to be used, and the claims or representations to be made in 
respect of its usefulness." Under section 24, any change or addition to a medicine's represented 
purposes must be notified to the Director-General in writing.  
While this somewhat allays the fear that the purpose in a drug manufacturer's mind will be 
unknowable, it does not resolve the issue. First, the disclosure provisions in sections 20 and 21 
do not apply to medicines that were generally available in New Zealand before the Act. 
Secondly, the Act does not require all the possible purposes of a drug to be disclosed, only 
those which the manufacturer or importer intends to publicise. Once the new medical use of a 
drug becomes known, there would be no need for the manufacturer or importer to expressly 
recommend their drug for that use and so the Act could be avoided. For example, an importer 
of aspirin could avoid infringing a Swiss-type patent on manufacturing aspirin for treating 
heart attacks by only recommending its use to treat pain and swelling. The drug's purchasers 
would know that aspirin could be used for reducing the likelihood of heart attacks, but if they 
did use the drugs for this purpose there would be no way to attribute this back to the 
manufacturer. Thirdly, even where a consent application includes within the list of 
recommended purposes the patented purpose, there is still the issue of whether the patented 
purpose has to be dominant, or substantial, or merely present, in the manufacturer's mind for 
infringement to occur.  
4 Judicial ignorance of the difficulties posed by Mobil and Eisai 
Unfortunately these practical difficulties were ignored in Eisai, Wyeth & Schering, Pharmac, 
and Mobil. In Eisai the Enlarged Board said, "[i]t is particularly important to bear in mind that 
Article 64(3) leaves the question of infringement to be dealt with by national law."193 In Mobil, 
national infringement laws were deemed irrelevant to questions of patentability because of a 
distinction between the protection and rights conferred by a patent,194 
There is a clear distinction between the protection that is conferred and the rights that are conferred 
by a European patent … . The protection conferred by a patent is determined by the terms of the 
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claims (Article 69(1) EPC) … . In this connection, Article 69 EPC and its Protocol are to be applied, 
both in proceedings before the EPO and in proceedings within the Contracting States … . In 
contrast, the rights conferred on the proprietor of a European patent (Article 64(1) EPC) are the 
legal rights which the law of a designated Contracting State may confer upon the proprietor, for 
example, as regards what acts of third parties constitute infringement of the patent, and as regards 
the remedies which are available in respect of any infringement." [emphasis added] 
This separation of "validity" and "infringement" was highly unsatisfactory because it left 
patentability to be determined without consideration of whether the patent would, in practical 
terms, be enforceable.195  
In my view it is essential for the granting authority to consider fully the implications of the claims it 
grants in relation to both validity and scope. It is not helpful to take a view on validity (particularly 
novelty) which simply leaves intractable problems for an infringement court - and for the public 
who need to know what they can and cannot do. 
Mobil thrust these problems into the spotlight and so it, rather than Eisai, has been the 
predominant target of criticism.196   
I should only add that it is apparent that the decision in Mobil is causing considerable difficulty to 
national courts. It is not good enough for these difficulties to be brushed aside, as for instance was 
done by Mr Paterson (a member of the Mobil Enlarged Board) in extra-judicial lectures … and in an 
article in the European Intellectual Property Review. Substantive European patent law demands a 
holistic approach to infringement and validity. Moreover by virtue of the EPC … it should have it. For 
myself, although I have no power of direct reference … I hope that the EPO will find a way of 
convening a fresh Enlarged Board (ideally including judges with experience of infringement) to 
reconsider Mobil." [emphasis added] 
Fortunately there are indications that Jacob J's "holistic approach" is growing in favour. A 
decision of the EPO's Technical Board of Appeals not to allow claims in the Swiss-type based 
on newly discovered uses for surgical equipment was partly based on the difficulty of proving 
whether a piece of equipment was manufactured for one use or another.197  
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In summary, if Mobil and Eisai remain good law, patents based on mere novelty of purpose 
will proliferate, with the test of infringement focusing on the infringer's subjective state of 
mind.198 One likely consequence is that infringement of Swiss-type patents will be extremely 
difficult to identify, and those patents hard to enforce. It has been said that when a case based 
squarely on the infringement of a Swiss-type claim finally comes before the courts, "one cannot 
… be certain that claims of this form will be upheld in such contested inter partes pleadings."199 
In the meantime, the difficulties of enforcement generated by patents based on novelty of 
purpose provide yet another reason for leaning away from their recognition. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that a dominant factor in various courts' decisions to 
follow Eisai has been the aura of authority enjoyed by the EPO's Enlarged Board of Appeals. 
The Mobil decision provides good reason for opening the Board's decisions to more assertive 
challenge. One positive sign was the UKPO's decision in Crane Ltd's200 that openly doubted 
whether Mobil applied under English patent law. Unfortunately this was overshadowed by 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc v HN Norton & Co Ltd,201 in which the House of Lords declined 
an opportunity to disapprove of Mobil. Yet there remains hope that the general outcry 
engendered by Mobil may spur future courts to cast a critical eye upon the same troublesome 
consequences generated by the EPO's acceptance of Swiss-type claims.  
E Swiss-Type Claims Allow Patents to be Granted For Mere Discoveries 
1 The invention versus discovery dichotomy 
The EPC specifically excludes from patentability, "a discovery, scientific theory, or 
mathematical model."202 The UKPO's Patent Practice Manual (December 1999) identifies 
another problem with allowing Swiss-type claims in that, "the fact that a known material or 
article is found to have hitherto unknown properties is a discovery and not an invention."203 
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One reason why the patent in BMS was disallowed was because, "noticing that the … three-
hour infusion caused less neutropenia is a mere discovery."204 [emphasis added] 
The distinction between patentable inventions and non-patentable discoveries invokes the 
same principle as the idea versus expression dichotomy in copyright law.205 Discoveries 
simply uncover existing facts and supposedly contain no element of intellectual creativity.206 
But the weakness is disallowing patents on this ground is that the mere recognition of 
previously unknown properties of known substances can amount to a valuable contribution to 
the state of the art. Often these discoveries will be the result of great work and expenditure, 
and under Lockean theory, which states that every person is entitled to property in the fruits of 
their labour,207 this alone justifies a patent grant. Lockean theory is responsible for the "sweat 
of the brow" doctrine accepted in England208 and, arguably, New Zealand.209 Although the 
United States rejects this doctrine,210 the fact that their patent legislation states, "[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter … may obtain a patent therefore…"211 [emphasis added], indicates that patentability 
will not turn on the invention versus discovery dichotomy. 
The dichotomy is still useful in drawing attention to the fact that Swiss-type claims are 
based on discoveries which may contain little or no creative element. The true danger is 
monopolies based on insignificant  advances.  
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2 Swiss-type claims are open to abuse as companies may claim patents following 
insignificant advances 
The danger that Swiss-type claims may effectively protect insignificant advances has led 
the English Court of Appeal to narrow the scope of their application. The Swiss-type claim in 
BMS was over the use of active ingredients to make a medicament to deliver taxol, after pre-
medication, to patients over three hours. Buxton LJ said, 212 
It is important in this inquiry to remember the emphasis placed by the Board on justification by 
analogy from cases of first medical use. Recognition of first medical use as a subject of patentability 
necessarily entails the use of the substance for a new and completely different purpose from that in 
relation to which it is already known. If the Board"s analogy is to hold, therefore, the relationship 
between the first and the second medical use must be of the same nature: the second medical use 
must be for an end-purpose distinctively different from the first, albeit also medical, purpose for 
which the substance was used. 
The Swiss-type claim in question was consequently disallowed because the new use, which 
differed only in the infusion's duration and the requirement for pre-medication, was too 
closely related to the known use.213  
BMS does not, however, remove the possibility that by analogy with Mobil, the new 
medical treatment underlying a Swiss-type claim might be a mere side-effect of an existing 
treatment. A hypothetical example would be a Swiss-type claim based on the discovery that a 
drug for treating stomach cramps was unexpectedly effective in alleviating headaches. While it 
would undoubtedly benefit the public to have this knowledge, it remains highly questionable 
whether a patent over the production of that pill for the new use should be granted. Whereas 
development of the pill for its original use would have necessitated expenditure on 
formulation and testing, the subsequent discovery could quite easily have been made by 
accident. Again, the possibility of introducing a "substantial research and development 
  
212 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals Inc (23 May 2000) LEXIS 2000 WL 664521 
(EWCA) para 83. 
213 This requirement was also alluded to in John Wyeth & Brother Ltd's Application Schering AG's Application 
[1985] RPC 545, 556 (UK Pat Ct) per Falconer J, stating that the case concerned, "the allowability of 
claims directed to an invention based on the discovery of a second (or subsequent) pharmaceutical use 
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expenditure" requirement of patentability214 might be useful in disqualifying patents based on 
truly non-creative discoveries. 
F Only Wealthy Corporations Can Make Use of Swiss-Type Claims  
Although the grant of a permissible type of patent should not depend upon the patentee's 
need for the associated financial gains, arguably the decision whether to disallow a type of 
patent altogether should account for the financial situation of its beneficiaries.  
As with all patents in the pharmaceutical world, the requirement that an invention be 
capable of industrial application necessitates expensive clinical trials before a patent can be 
granted. Thus, "a clear indication that such a treatment has been tried and tested is essential to 
provide the necessary support for the claim."215 For example, in 1996, Dr Wilhelm Hoerrman 
sought a Swiss-type patent following his discovery that a known composition of lysine and 
hydroxylysine was effective in treating a variety of inflammatory conditions including 
rheumatic fever, scarlatina and prostatitis. Dr Hoerrman was not professionally represented 
and fitted the romantic picture of the "individual inventor". His patent claim was refused 
because of the absence of, "any pharmacological-data to show that lysine or hydroxylysine is 
active against any of the ailments specified in the claims."216 Dr Hoerrmann was caught in the 
position that without a patent he could not afford clinical trials, yet without clinical trials, he 
could not receive a patent. The fact that the claim was of the Swiss-type also meant that 
greater-than-normal testing was expected in order to differentiate the new use from the state of 
the art.217  
This requirement excludes individual inventors and non-wealthy companies from the 
range of Swiss-type claims' potential beneficiaries,218 the very entities that patents should 
arguably benefit most.219  
  
214 Beata Gocyk-Farber "Patenting Medial Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics and 
Economics" (1997) 18 Cardoza L Rev 1527, 1558. 
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216 Hoerrman's Application [1996] RPC 341, 344 (UKPO) per Mr Wood. 
217 Hoerrman's Application [1996] RPC 341, 345 (UKPO)  per Mr Wood. 
218 See Prendergast's Application (7 July 1999) unreported, UK Patents Court, per Mr Justice Neuberger, 
where Dr Prendergast argued that the rejection of his patent on grounds of inadequate testing would 
make it very difficult for an individual or small company to succeed in making Swiss-type claims. The 
court accepted this as a true statement, but felt that this outcome was unavoidable. 
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The important question is then whether the remaining beneficiaries truly need the 
additional financial benefits of Swiss-type claims. The answer is no. The global pharmaceutical 
industry has thrived for decades without these benefits, and "thrived" must be emphasised 
because the pharmaceutical industry is one of the world's richest. In 1999, "the pharmaceutical 
industry enjoyed profits of 18.6 percent of revenues, or nearly four times the median for Fortune 
500 companies."220 These super-profits are contentious. US Presidential candidate Al Gore 
commented, "these companies have so much power ... that they make campaign contributions 
and lobby and introduce these [patent extension] bills to extend the monopoly period", adding 
that any such patent protection extension would amount to an "unfair monopoly".221 Swiss-
type claims are themselves a variety of patent protection extension, and the wealthy status of 
the privileged few that will benefit from them undermines any argument that they are 
necessary. 
G Swiss-Type Claims Endanger Public Health  
Although a person making a Swiss-type claim must submit evidence of the new treatment's 
efficacy, where appropriate the tests conducted can be rudimentary rather than 
comprehensive.222 The danger is that to the lay public, the granting of a Swiss-type patent may 
be misunderstood as a governmental seal of approval.223 This means that ostensible validity 
can be accorded to a new method of treatment upon the judgment of a patent examiner rather 
than highly-trained medical experts.  
Since Swiss-type patents deal with drugs already in circulation, the public will immediately 
be able to experiment with the claimed new use. This problem does not arise when dealing 
with product patents on new drugs, because each nation's health authorities, for example the 
US Food and Drug Administration, can still withhold the drug from the market pending more 
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Oxford, 1985) 32-41. 
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222 Prendergast's Application (7 July 1999) unreported, UK Patents Court per Mr Justice Neuberger. 
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extensive trials. But following the grant of a Swiss-type patent, and the publicity surrounding a 
claimed "breakthrough" cure, members of the public can buy the old drug and use it at the new 
(unproven) dosage levels with the new (unproven) treatment purpose in mind.  
For example, in 1999, Australian rheumatologist Dr Henry Betts claimed to have discovered 
that lyprinol, an anti-arthritis drug extracted from green-lipped mussels, killed cancer cells in 
lab conditions.224 Since lyprinol was already in the marketplace, health authorities could only 
respond to the resulting media hype with warnings, they could not prevent people from 
buying and consuming lyprinol (and green-lipped mussels) in reliance upon the researchers' 
claims.225 The same blind trust following the grant of a Swiss-type claim could similarly lead 
to the widespread consumption of drugs for a use that has not withstood extensive scrutiny.  
V CONCLUSION 
The centuries-old "research incentive versus widespread dissemination" debate will never 
be conclusively resolved because there will always be attractive arguments for both 
proponents and opponents of intellectual property. For this reason, on any particular issue the 
line between protection and non-protection can be drawn in several possible locations. The 
thrust of this essay is that on the issue of Swiss-type claims the line should tend towards the 
"widespread dissemination / non-protection" end of this conceptual scale, and should certainly 
be drawn with Swiss-type claims on the "non-protected" side.  
The introduction of Swiss-type claims allows drug manufacturers to gain patents following 
what can be insignificant, non-creative contributions to the public domain. These claims can 
only benefit wealthy companies that need neither the resulting financial reward, nor the 
research incentive they supposedly bring. The difficulties in proving infringement of a Swiss-
type claim mean that their operation will be fraught with uncertainty and might unfairly 
expose companies to expensive litigation. Most alarmingly, these claims threaten public health 
by restricting the availability of needed drugs and by encouraging premature faith in the safety 
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and effectiveness of new medical uses. Aside from these grave practical drawbacks, Swiss-type 
claims are legally deficient in that they draw legitimacy from an incorrect interpretation of the 
EPC and violate the general rule that the patentability requirement of novelty is satisfied only 
when the patent's subject-matter is novel. Sadly these reasons for rejecting Swiss-type claims 
have been ignored by courts unable to handle the complex socioeconomic arguments raised, or 
have fallen before the powerful ideal of conformity. Jacob J, referred to on appeal in BMS as, "a 
specialist judge in a specialist field",226 is one of the resolute few that has challenged this trend 
and it is hoped that this essay may cause others to follow that lead. 
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